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I.

INTRODUCTION

Digital evidence is now offered commonly at trial. Examples include
emails, spreadsheets, evidence from websites, digitally-enhanced
photographs, PowerPoint presentations, texts, tweets, Facebook posts, and
computerized versions of disputed events. Does the fact that an item is
electronic raise any special challenges in authenticating that item?
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In federal courts, authenticity is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence
901(a), which requires that to establish that an item is authentic, a
proponent must produce admissible evidence “sufficient to support a
finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”1 Rule 901(b)
provides many examples of evidence that satisfies the standard of proof for
establishing authenticity, including testimony of a witness with knowledge,2
circumstantial evidence,3 and evidence describing a process or system that
shows that it produces an accurate result.4 The standards and examples
provided by Rule 901(a) and (b) are by design flexible enough to adapt to
all forms of evidence—including electronic evidence.
That does not mean that authenticating digital evidence is automatic.
There are a large number of reported cases dealing with authentication of
digital evidence over the last fifteen years. Digital evidence can present the
challenge of convincing the court that it has not been altered or hacked and
that it comes from a certain source. The Judicial Conference Advisory
Committee on Evidence Rules, surveying this case law, determined that the
Bench and Bar would be well-served by published guidelines that would set
forth the factors that should be taken into account for authenticating each of
the major new forms of digital evidence that are being offered in the
courts.5
The idea for providing guidelines grew out of a symposium sponsored
by the Advisory Committee on the challenges of electronic evidence.6 One
of the participants of the symposium, Gregory Joseph, proposed rule
amendments that would establish new rules governing the authenticity of
electronic evidence.7 But the Advisory Committee decided that a
rulemaking solution was not optimal for a number of reasons: (1) the length

1

FED. R. EVID. 901(a). Evidence proffered to support authenticity of a challenged item must
itself be admissible, because authenticity will ultimately have to be established to the factfinder.
See, e.g., United States v. Bonds, 608 F.3d 495, 500–02 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that records could
not be authenticated where the only basis for authentication was a hearsay statement not
admissible under any exception).
2
FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1).
3
Id. 901(b)(4).
4
Id. 901(b)(9).
5
See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMM. ON EVIDENCE RULES, MINUTES 9–10 (Fall
2014).
6
See Symposium, The Challenges of Electronic Evidence, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1163, 1255–
62 (2014).
7
Id. at 1258–62.
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of the rulemaking process could mean that a rule might be outmoded by
technological development before it could be enacted; (2) the Evidence
Rules do not ordinarily set forth lists of factors that are relevant to
admissibility, given the risk of underinclusiveness; (3) authentication will
require weighing relevant factors on a case-by-case approach—an approach
that requires more flexibility than might be found in a set of hard-and-fast
rules; and (4) the existing rules on authenticity are broad and flexible
enough to cover electronic evidence.8
After the Advisory Committee decided not to propose rule amendments
to authenticate digital evidence, the Reporter to the Advisory Committee
began to work with two noted authorities on electronic evidence—Hon.
Paul Grimm and Gregory P. Joseph, Esq.—to set forth standards and
principles governing such authentication. The result is this article; it is the
work of the authors alone.
This article begins (in Part II) with an analysis of the basic rules on
authenticating evidence, with a focus on digital evidence and the interplay
between Evidence Rules 104(a) (providing that the judge is to decide
admissibility factors by a preponderance of the evidence) and Rule 104(b)
(providing that for questions of conditional relevance—such as
authenticity—the standard of proof for admissibility is enough evidence
sufficient to support a finding).
Following the introduction, Part III sets forth some guidelines on
authentication of the kinds of electronic evidence that are most frequently
offered in litigation today: (1) emails; (2) texts; (3) chatroom conversations;
(4) web postings; and (5) social media postings.9 In Part IV, we consider
whether and when the proponent might argue that the court can take judicial
notice of the authenticity of certain digital evidence. Finally, Part V
8

See generally Memorandum from Daniel J. Capra, Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law, to Judicial
Conference Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules (Oct. 1, 2014) (on file with author); see also
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMM. ON EVIDENCE RULES, MINUTES 8–10 (Fall 2014).
9
This article covers the relatively new forms of electronic communications. Parties have been
authenticating more traditional forms of electronic evidence for many years—examples include
telephone conversations, audiotapes, and video recordings. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 530
F.2d 639, 641–42 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding that video evidence from a bank security camera was
properly authenticated where testimony revealed the camera was present on the day in question,
was facing the events of an armed robbery, and was functioning properly). This pamphlet does not
cover such traditional forms of electronic communication. For more on authentication of such
information, see STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. MARTIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 901 (11th ed. 2015), which provides relevant case law and
commentary.
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provides an extensive analysis of two amendments to the Federal Rules of
Evidence—Rules 902(13) and (14)—scheduled to go into effect on
December 1, 2017, that will ease the burden of authenticating electronic
evidence.
At the outset, it is important to emphasize that the standard for
establishing authenticity of digital evidence is the same mild standard as for
traditional forms of evidence. The factors set forth below are not required to
be met in toto before digital evidence is found authentic. They are just
relevant factors, and usually, satisfying one or two of any of the listed
factors will be enough to convince the court that a juror could find the
digital evidence to be authentic. But the factors will need to be applied caseby-case.

II. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF AUTHENTICATION FOR
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RULE 104(A)
AND RULE 104(B).
This article is designed to provide answers to the fundamental
evidentiary questions of how to authenticate digital evidence. But before
turning to the authentication rules themselves, there are two preliminary
rules that must be discussed and understood, because without them,
authentication decisions are apt to be erroneous. These rules are Fed. R.
Evid. 104(a) (which states the general rule governing preliminary questions
about the admissibility of evidence) and Fed. R. Evid. 104(b) (the so-called
“conditional relevance” rule10). Understanding these two rules is essential to
making correct decisions about the authentication of digital evidence.
We start with Rule 104(a). Its text is deceptively straightforward: “[t]he
court must decide any preliminary question about whether a witness is
qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is admissible. In so deciding, the
court is not bound by evidence rules, except those on privilege.”11 Most
decisions about admissibility of evidence, whether digital or otherwise, are
made by the judge alone.12 They include decisions about whether evidence
is relevant, constitutes hearsay (or fits within one of the many hearsay
exceptions), is excessively prejudicial when compared to its probative
value; whether experts are qualified and the extent of opinion testimony that
will be allowed; and most questions regarding application of the original
10

FED. R. EVID. 104(b) advisory committee’s note to 1972 amendment.
FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (emphasis added).
12
See id.; Symposium, supra note 6, at 1175.
11
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writing rule.13 When the judge makes a ruling under Rule 104(a), he or she
is the sole decision-maker as to whether the evidence may be heard by the
jury.14 If admitted, of course, the jury is free to give the evidence whatever
weight (if any) they think it deserves.15 This is familiar turf to trial judges,
but with digital evidence, there is a greater likelihood that the judge alone
may not be the final decision-maker regarding admissibility. The jury also
may have a part to play in the admissibility decision, and this is where Rule
104(b) comes in.
Rule 104(b) qualifies Rule 104(a). It provides “[w]hen the relevance of
evidence depends on whether a fact exists, proof must be introduced
sufficient to support a finding that the fact does exist. The court may admit
the proposed evidence on the condition that the proof be introduced later.”16
Read in isolation, Rule 104(b) seems too abstract to be helpful. But, in the
case of disputes over the authenticity of digital evidence, it can be an
important qualifier to the general rule of 104(a) that the trial judge decides
questions about the admissibility of evidence.
An illustration will help bring things into focus. Imagine the following
variations of a common theme. In an employment discrimination case, the
plaintiff, a woman, alleges that her supervisor, a man, intentionally
discriminated against her in deciding to promote a lesser-qualified man to a
position that the plaintiff sought. As evidence of intentional discrimination,
the plaintiff wants to introduce an email that she asserts her supervisor sent
to her that says: “Jane, stop bugging me about the sales supervisor position.
Your track record compared to the men in our sales group is terrible, and
confirms what I always have suspected. Women just don’t have the stuff it
takes to get out there and sell our products. You should be glad you still
have your sales job, and quit trying to be something you can never do well.
Bob.” The email is from the company email account (Bob@company.com),
addressed to the plaintiff (Jane@company.com), apparently signed by the
supervisor (Bob), discusses a subject matter about which the supervisor has
knowledge, and is dated on a day and time the supervisor was known to be
at the office. Plaintiff contends that the email is “smoking gun” evidence of
intentional gender discrimination.

13

See Symposium, supra note 6, at 1175.
Id. at 1175–76.
15
Id.
16
FED. R. EVID. 104(b).
14
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Imagine further the following scenarios when the plaintiff offers the
email into evidence at trial.
One: the defense attorney objects to the introduction of the email, the
judge asks for the basis of the objection, and the defense attorney simply
says “inadequate foundation.”
Two: the defense attorney objects, the judge asks for the basis of the
objection, and the defense attorney says: “Judge, this is an email, there is no
evidence that the supervisor was the one who actually wrote it. It was found
on a company computer, anyone in the company had access to that
computer, including the plaintiff herself, whose office was right next to his,
and my client is often away from his desk during the day, and he does not
log out of his computer. Plaintiff hasn’t shown that someone else didn’t
send that email pretending to be my client, and everyone knows how easy it
is to fake an email.”
Three: the defense attorney objects, the judge asks for the basis of the
objection, and the defense attorney says: “Judge, my client will testify that
on the day and time stated on the email he was at a sales meeting with the
other supervisors and the president of the company. Five other people saw
him there at that day and time and will testify that they did. During those
meetings, no one is allowed to use their smartphone or to send or receive
emails, on pain of being fired if the president sees them looking at their
phones. The location of the meeting was on a different floor from where my
client and the plaintiff work. He will testify that he did not send the email,
and that when he leaves his office he does not log out, his computer stays
on, and anyone can access it without a password and use his office email
account. He also will testify that when he came back from the meeting, the
plaintiff looked at him in a strange way, and said ‘I wouldn’t look so smug
if I were you. You might not be that way for very long.’”
With these scenarios in mind, what is the interplay between Rule 104(a)
and 104(b) in determining whether the email may be admitted at trial and
considered by the jury? In the first scenario, no explanation was given by
the defense attorney for excluding the email other than the conclusory
statement that the plaintiff had not laid a sufficient foundation. Here, the
trial judge alone decides, under Rule 104(a), whether an adequate
foundation has been established. If the foundation was deficient, the judge
will require the plaintiff’s lawyer to make a fuller showing, and allow or
exclude the email accordingly. Rule 104(b) is not implicated.
In the second scenario, the defense attorney has made a conclusory legal
argument that provides no facts showing that the supervisor did not author
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the email, but rather speculates that it could have been written by someone
else. The argument invites the trial judge to require the plaintiff’s lawyer to
“prove a negative”—that no one but the supervisor was the author. But this
is not the burden that the plaintiff must meet under Rule 104(a) to establish
the admissibility of the email. Rather, all that plaintiff must do is to meet
the obligation imposed by Rule 901(a), which is to “produce evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it
is.”17 Certainty is not required. All that is needed is evidence sufficient to
convince a reasonable juror that, more likely than not, the email is what the
plaintiff claims it is—an email her supervisor drafted. And, under the
hypothetical facts of the second scenario, the defense counsel is wrong in
saying the plaintiff has offered no evidence that the email came from the
supervisor. She has shown that the email came from the supervisor’s email
address, on the company email server, on a day when the supervisor was at
the office, discussing a topic about which the supervisor had knowledge,
and is signed with his name. Certainly this would be an example of
authentication under Rule 901(b)(4), where the “appearance, contents,
substance . . . or other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together
with all the circumstances”18 tend to show that the supervisor authored the
email.
The second scenario also raises only Rule 104(a) issues for the trial
judge alone to determine admissibility. The facts, under which admissibility
must be judged, are undisputed. If the trial judge concludes (as she should
under these facts) that a reasonable juror could find from the foundation
presented that it is more likely than not that the supervisor wrote the email,
it is admissible. Defense counsel’s speculation about what “could” have
happened is reserved for argument to the jury about how much weight (if
any) to give to the email. Absent from scenario two is evidence that the
supervisor in fact did not author the email, to contradict the undisputed facts
introduced by the plaintiff regarding the distinctive characteristics of the
email that associate it with the supervisor. Put another way, if “it might
have been hacked” or “it might have been photoshopped” were enough to
preclude authentication, then no digital evidence could ever be
authenticated.19
17

Id. 901(a).
Id. 901(b)(4).
19
See, e.g., United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 41 (D.D.C. 2006) (“The possibility
of alteration does not and cannot be the basis for excluding e-mails as unidentified or
unauthenticated as a matter of course, any more than it can be the rationale for excluding paper
18
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Scenario three does introduce facts contradicting the evidence the
plaintiff introduced about the distinctive characteristics of the email tying it
to the supervisor. The defense attorney has proffered that he will introduce
evidence (the supervisor, the five witnesses who corroborate that he was
with them at the time the email was sent, the policy prohibiting use of cell
phones during meetings with the company president, the meeting’s location
on a different floor of the building). Now the trial judge is presented with
competing evidence that the supervisor did, and did not, author the email. If
the plaintiff’s evidence is accepted over that of the defendant, then it is
more likely than not that the supervisor is the author, and the email is
relevant to show his discriminatory intent. But, if the defendant’s version of
the facts is accepted over those offered by the plaintiff, then the supervisor
did not author the email, and it is irrelevant to prove his state of mind. The
relevance of the email turns on whether the plaintiff’s version or the
defendant’s version is accepted, and this falls squarely within the scope of
Rule 104(b). The relevance of the email depends on the existence of a
disputed fact—authorship of the email. Who decides between the
competing versions? If the case is tried before a jury, it is the jury, not the
judge, who must resolve the dispute.20 The judge’s role under Rule 104(a) is
to evaluate whether a reasonable jury could find (more likely than not)
either that the supervisor did, or did not, author the email. If either version
is plausible, then the judge conditionally admits the email, but at the time it
is introduced instructs the jury that if they find that the plaintiff has shown
that the supervisor more likely than not authored the email, they may
consider it as evidence and give it the weight that they feel it is entitled to.

documents (and copies of those documents). . . . Absent specific evidence showing alteration . . .
the Court will not exclude any . . . e-mails because of the mere possibility that it can be done.”).
20
The Advisory Committee explains when the jury must resolve the dispute:
If preliminary questions of conditional relevancy were determined solely by the
judge, as provided in subdivision (a), the functioning of the jury as a trier of fact would
be greatly restricted and in some cases virtually destroyed. These are appropriate
questions for juries. Accepted treatment, as provided in the rule, is consistent with that
given fact questions generally. The judge makes a preliminary determination whether
the foundation evidence is sufficient to support a finding of fulfillment of the condition.
If so, the item is admitted. If after all the evidence on the issue is in, pro and con, the
jury could reasonably conclude that fulfillment of the condition is not established, the
issue is for them. If the evidence is not such as to allow a finding, the judge withdraws
the matter from their consideration.
FED. R. EVID. 104(b) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposal.
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Contrastingly, if they find that the defendant has persuaded them that, more
likely than not, he did not author the email, they must disregard it entirely,
and give it no weight in their deliberations. The final decision about
whether the email has been admitted (and can be considered by the jury) or
excluded (and disregarded by the jury) must await the jury’s deliberation on
the merits of the case. The judge makes a preliminary assessment of
whether the evidence is one-sided or two, and if the latter, submits it to the
jury for their decision. The issue of conditional relevance generated by
disputed facts regarding the authenticity (and hence, relevance) of evidence
is especially prevalent with digital evidence.
It is important for judges to distinguish between which of the scenarios
listed above is presented to them when ruling on admissibility of digital
evidence. For scenario one situations, the judge alone decides whether the
proponent has laid a proper foundation to authenticate the digital evidence.
Most often, the judge will consider whether one or more of the illustrations
of how to authenticate found at Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)21 or 90222 has been
shown.
For scenario two situations, the judge alone makes the decision whether
to admit or exclude. In doing so, he must be careful not to let
unparticularized and conclusory argument by the party objecting to the
introduction of the digital evidence about what “might” or “could have
happened” lead him to impose on the proponent of the evidence a burden of
21
For digital evidence, the most useful authentication rules within Rule 901(b) are: 901(b)(1)
(a witness with personal knowledge that the evidence is what it purports to be); 901(b)(3)
(comparison of the evidence with an authenticated specimen by an expert witness or the finder of
fact); 901(b)(4) (“the appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns or other distinctive
characteristics of the item, taken together with all the circumstances”); 901(b)(5) (for audio
recordings, an opinion identifying a person’s voice, whether heard firsthand or through electronic
transmission or recording, based on having heard that voice in the past); and 901(b)(9) (“evidence
describing a process or system and showing that it produces an accurate result”).
22
Federal Rule of Evidence 902 provides examples of self-authentication, where no extrinsic
evidence or testimony is needed to authenticate. FED. R. EVID. 902. The following selfauthentication rules may be helpful for digital evidence: 902(5) (“A book, pamphlet, or other
publication purporting to be issued by a public authority.” Most public authorities have web sites
and post publications relating to their fields of jurisdiction.); 902(6) (“Printed material purporting
to be a newspaper or periodical.” Most newspapers and periodicals have “on line editions,” and
this rule potentially is available to self-authenticate.); 902(11) and (12) (Certified copy of
domestic and foreign records of regularly conducted activities); proposed Rule 902(13) (Certified
copy of machine-generated information); and Rule 902(14) (proposed May 7, 2015) (Certified
copy of computer generated or stored information). Authentication under proposed Rules 902(13)
and (14) is discussed in a separate section. See infra Part V.
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proof greater than that ordinarily required by Rule 104(a)—a showing that
the evidence more likely than not is what it purports to be.23 It is a mistake
for a judge to require the party introducing digital evidence to prove that no
one other than the purported maker could have created the evidence if the
introducing party has shown that, more likely than not, it was created by a
particular person, unless there is evidence (not argument) that some other
person could have done so.24 Finally, for scenario three situations, where
the judge is faced with competing facts plausibly showing that the digital
evidence was, and was not, created by the person claimed by the proponent,
then she should allow the evidence to be admitted “conditionally” under
Rule 104(b). The judge should then instruct the jury that if they find that the
evidence that the person claimed to have created the evidence did not do so
is more believable than the evidence that he did, they must disregard it and
give it no weight in their deliberations.
Careful attention to the interplay between Rule 104(a) and 104(b), as
well as consideration of the abundant authentication tools identified in
Rules 901(b) and 902, will go a long way towards removing the mystery
about authenticating digital evidence, even when the technology at play is
unfamiliar to the judge. In the end, technical expertise is not needed. Rather,
an awareness of the fundamental evidence rules governing admissibility and
authentication of any evidence, whether digital or not, is all that is needed.
And this article aims to provide illustrations to make the effort even easier.

III. RELEVANT FACTORS FOR AUTHENTICATING DIGITAL EVIDENCE
What follows are general guidelines and lists of relevant factors for
authenticating the basic forms of digital evidence that have developed over
the last twenty years. The lists of relevant factors do not purport to be
exclusive. There is no attempt to weigh the factors, or to take a cumulative
approach, as the importance of any factor will be case-dependent. And there
is no intent to imply that all of the factors listed must be met before the
proffered digital evidence can be found authentic.
In evaluating all the factors below, it is important to remember that the
threshold for the court’s determination of authenticity under Rule 901 is not
23

See FED. R. EVID. 901(a).
Hon. Paul W. Grimm et al., Authentication of Social Media Evidence, 36 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 433, 459 (2013) (“A trial judge should admit the evidence if there is plausible evidence
of authenticity produced by the proponent of the evidence and only speculation or conjecture—not
facts—by the opponent of the evidence about how, or by whom, it ‘might’ have been created.”).
24
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high: “[t]he [c]ourt need not find that the evidence is necessarily what the
proponent claims, but only that there is sufficient evidence that the jury
ultimately might do so.”25
Generally speaking, it will be a rare case in which an item of digital
evidence cannot be authenticated. The question is whether the proponent is
willing and able to expend the resources necessary to do so.26 The factors
set forth below are intended to direct litigants to ways in which resources
can be usefully spent on authenticating digital evidence—and on ways to
avoid such costs in certain situations.

A. Emails
The authentication questions for email most commonly focus on
whether the email was sent or received by the person whom the party
claims sent or received it. There are a number of factors that will assist the
proponent in establishing authenticity for either or both of these purposes.
Among them are:

1. A Witness With Personal Knowledge May Testify to
Authenticity.27
Possibilities include:
 The author of the email in question testifies to its authenticity.28
 A witness testifies that s/he saw the email in question being
authored/received by the person who the proponent claims
authored/received it.29
25

United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 38 (D.D.C. 2006).
See Jeffrey Bellin & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Trial by Google: Judicial Notice in the
Information Age, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1137, 1157 (2014) (“Although much is made of [the
authentication] hurdle in the Information Age, it is . . . an easy one to surmount. Success generally
depends not on legal or factual arguments, but rather the amount of time and resources a litigant
devotes to the problem.”) (footnote omitted).
27
See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1).
28
See, e.g., Anderson v. United States, Nos. 4:11-CR-006-01-HLM-WEJ, 4:14-CV-0114HLM-WEJ, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166799, at *13 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 2, 2014) (finding a sufficient
showing of authenticity where defendant-witness acknowledged that the documents in question
contained emails he sent to an undercover agent, the emails were sent from his email address, and
the document contained the entirety of his email exchange with the undercover agent); see also
Citizens Bank & Trust v. LPS Nat’l Flood, LLC, 51 F. Supp. 3d 1157, 1163 (N.D. Ala. 2014)
(finding that witness’s personal knowledge of email contents and her affidavit authenticating
emails as the ones she sent were sufficient for admissibility).
26
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The recipient of emails in an email chain testifies that the
emails accurately represent the conversation between him and
the author in question.30

2. Business Records.
The custodian of records of a regularly conducted activity testifies to a
foundation, or certifies, in accordance with Fed. R. Evid. 902(11) or (12),
that an email satisfies the criteria of Fed. R. Evid. 803(6).31 It should be

29

See United States v. Fluker, 698 F.3d 988, 999 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating, in outlining the
variety of ways in which an email could be authenticated, that testimony from a witness who
purports to have seen the declarant create the email in question was sufficient for authenticity
under Rule 901(b)(1)).
30
United States v. White, No. 15-12025, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 15675, at *5 (11th Cir. Aug.
25, 2016) (allowing a witness to authenticate an email chain with many emails sent between the
defendant and the witness, and holding the “anomalies and inconsistencies” in the email were
insufficient to impact the admissibility of the documents).
31
Rules 902(11) and (12) provide for a means of certifying the authenticity of a business
record, as well as the foundation requirements for the business records exception (Rule 803(6)) by
way of a certificate of a qualified witness. The rules state as follows:
Rule 902. Evidence That Is Self-Authenticating
The following items of evidence are self-authenticating; they require no
extrinsic evidence of authenticity in order to be admitted:
....
(11) Certified Domestic Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity. The
original or a copy of a domestic record that meets the requirements of Rule
803(6)(A)–(C), as shown by a certification of the custodian or another
qualified person that complies with a federal statute or a rule prescribed by
the Supreme Court. Before the trial or hearing, the proponent must give an
adverse party reasonable written notice of the intent to offer the record—and
must make the record and certification available for inspection—so that the
party has a fair opportunity to challenge them.
(12) Certified Foreign Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity. In a civil
case, the original or a copy of a foreign record that meets the requirements of
Rule 902(11), modified as follows: the certification, rather than complying
with a federal statute or Supreme Court rule, must be signed in a manner that,
if falsely made, would subject the maker to a criminal penalty in the country
where the certification is signed. The proponent must also meet the notice
requirements of Rule 902(11).
FED. R. EVID. 902(11)–(12).
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noted, however, that emails—even of a business, do not automatically
qualify as business records.32

3. Jury Comparison With Other Authenticated Emails.33
The authenticity of an email can be determined by the trier of fact by
comparing the email in question with emails already authenticated and in
evidence.34

4. Production in Discovery.
If a document request is sufficiently descriptive, production in response
to that request may serve in itself to authenticate the email, as the act of
production may be a concession that the document is what the party asked
for—and thus is what the party says it is. The act of production can
constitute a statement of a party-opponent and consequently admissible
evidence of authenticity.35 Authentication has also been found when an
adversary produces in discovery a third party’s email received by the
producing party in the ordinary course of business, and the email is offered

32

See, e.g., United States v. Cone, 714 F.3d 197, 220 (4th Cir. 2013) (“While properly
authenticated e-mails may be admitted into evidence under the business records exception, it
would be insufficient to survive a hearsay challenge simply to say that since a business keeps and
receives e-mails, then ergo all those e-mails are business records falling within the ambit of Rule
803(6)(B).”); Morisseau v. DLA Piper, 532 F. Supp. 2d 595, 621 n.163 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“An email created within a business entity does not, for that reason alone, satisfy the business records
exception of the hearsay rule.”). It is probably fair to state that emails and social media postings
will often be prepared too casually and irregularly to be admissible as business records. But this is
not inevitably so, and again if the electronic communication does fit the admissibility
requirements it is just as admissible as a hardcopy record.
33
FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(3).
34
United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 40 (D.D.C. 2006) (“Those emails that are not
clearly identifiable on their own can be authenticated under Rule 901(b)(3), which states that such
evidence may be authenticated by comparison by the trier of fact (the jury) with ‘specimens which
have been [otherwise] authenticated’—in this case, those emails that already have been
independently authenticated . . . .”) (alteration in original).
35
See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2); see also, e.g., Nola Fine Art, Inc. v. Ducks Unlimited, Inc., 88
F. Supp. 3d 602, 607 (E.D. La. 2015) (“[Defendant] produced the email to plaintiffs in discovery
and therefore cannot seriously dispute the email’s authenticity.”); AT Engine Controls Ltd. v.
Goodrich Pump & Engine Control Sys., Inc., No. 3:10-cv-01539 (JAM), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
174535, at *28–29 n.12 (D. Conn. Dec. 18, 2014) (collecting cases holding that production of
emails in discovery constitutes a concession of authenticity).
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against the adversary.36 But some production may be so massive and
extensive that it cannot be concluded that production itself is a concession
of authenticity. Moreover, it is possible that a party might knowingly
produce inauthentic documents, such as a forged check, and such
production could not be found to be tantamount to authentication.

5. Circumstantial Evidence.37
Applying Rule 901(b)(4)—covering authentication on the basis of
“appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive
characteristics of the item”—requires consideration of the totality of
circumstantial evidence.38 While any one factor may be insufficient to
determine admissibility, when circumstantial factors are weighed together,
authenticity may be established. “This rule is one of the most frequently
used to authenticate email and other electronic records.”39
Set forth below are circumstances that can, alone or in conjunction
(depending on the case), establish authenticity. Different circumstantial
factors may be relevant depending on whether the authenticity dispute is
over whether a person sent or received the email.

a. Authenticating Authorship Circumstantially.
The Inclusion of Some or All of the Following in an Email Can Be
Sufficient to Authenticate the Email as Having Been Sent by a Particular
Person:
 the purported author’s known email address;40
 the author’s electronic signature;
 the author’s name;41

36

Broadspring, Inc. v. Congoo, LLC, No. 13-CV-1866 (JMF), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
177838, at *8–9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2014) (holding that third party emails sent to a party in the
ordinary course of business and produced by the party in litigation are sufficiently authenticated
by the act of production when offered by an opponent, but hearsay and other admissibility
objections as to the third parties’ statements must separately be satisfied).
37
FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4).
38
Id.; see United States v. Henry, 164 F.3d 1304, 1309 (10th Cir. 1999).
39
Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 546 (D. Md. 2007).
40
See, e.g., United States v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that an
email identified as originating from the defendant’s email address and that automatically included
the defendant’s address when the reply function was selected was considered sufficiently
authenticated).

7 GRIMM, CAPRA, JOSEPH (DO NOT DELETE)

16

BAYLOR LAW REVIEW

3/23/2017 9:56 AM

[Vol. 69:1









the author’s nickname;42
the author’s screen name;
the author’s initials;
the author’s moniker;43
the author’s customary use of emoji or emoticons;
the author’s use of the same email address elsewhere;
a writing style similar or identical to the purported author’s manner
of writing;
 reference to facts only the purported author or a small subset of
individuals including the purported author would know;44
 reference to facts uniquely tied to the author—e.g., contact
information for relatives or loved ones; photos of the author or
items of importance to the author (e.g., car, pet); the author’s
personal information, such as a cell phone number, social security
number, etc.45

41

See, e.g., United States v. Fluker, 698 F.3d 988, 999–1000 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding that
emails sent from a “More Than Enough, LLC” (MTE) email address were sufficiently
authenticated when the purported author was an MTE board member and “[i]t would be
reasonable for one to assume that an MTE Board [m]ember would possess an email address
bearing the MTE acronym”); United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 40 (D.D.C. 2006)
(holding that email messages were properly authenticated when containing distinctive
characteristics, including email addresses and name of the person connected to the address).
42
United States v. Brinson, 772 F.3d 1314, 1320 (10th Cir. 2014) (use of fake name
commonly used by defendant).
43
See United States v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241, 1244 (10th Cir. 1998) (using chatroom log
where user “Stavron” identified himself as the defendant and shared his email address was used to
authenticate subsequent emails from that email address).
44
See Siddiqui, 235 F.3d at 1322 (ruling that messages that referred to facts only the
defendant was familiar with were admissible).
45
Commonwealth v. Amaral, 941 N.E.2d 1143, 1147 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (“In other emails, Jeremy provided his telephone number and photograph. When the trooper called that
number, the defendant immediately answered his telephone, and the photograph was a picture of
the defendant. These actions served to confirm that the author of the e-mails and the defendant
were one and the same.”) (citing MASS. G. EVID. § 901(b)(6)).
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Factors Outside the Content of the Email Itself Can Establish
Authenticity of Authorship Circumstantially. For Example:
 a witness testifies that the author told him to expect an email prior to
its arrival;46
 the purported author acts in accordance with, and in response to, an
email exchange with the witness;
 the author orally repeats the contents soon after the email is sent;
 the author discusses the contents of the email with a third party;
 the author leaves a voicemail with substantially the same content.
Forensic Information May Be Used to Support a Circumstantial Showing
That the Email Was Sent by the Purported Author. Forensic Sources
Include:
 an email’s hash values;47
 testimony from a forensic witness that an email issued from a
particular device at a particular time.48

46

People v. Ruiz, No. 313087, 2014 Mich. App. LEXIS 855, at *10 (Mich. Ct. App. May 15,
2014) (interpreting MRE 901) (noting that witness testified to knowing the defendant authored an
email because the defendant told him to expect an email relating to arson—the contents of the
email subsequently received).
47
A hash value is:
[a] unique numerical identifier that can be assigned to a file, a group of files, or a
portion of a file, based on a standard mathematical algorithm applied to the
characteristics of the data set. The most commonly used algorithms, known as MD5
and SHA, will generate numerical values so distinctive that the chance that any two
data sets will have the same hash value, no matter how similar they appear, is less than
one in one billion. ‘Hashing’ is used to guarantee the authenticity of an original data set
and can be used as a digital equivalent of the Bates stamp used in paper document
production.
BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN, RONALD J. HEDGES & ELIZABETH C. WIGGINS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER, MANAGING DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONIC INFORMATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES
24 (2007); see also Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 547 (D. Md. 2007) (noting
that “[h]ash values can be inserted into original electronic documents when they are created to
provide them with distinctive characteristics that will permit their authentication under Rule
901(b)(4).”).
48
Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 547–48 (holding that because an electronic message’s metadata
(including an email’s metadata) can reveal when, where, and by whom the message was authored,
it could be used to successfully authenticate a document under 901(b)(4)).
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b. Authenticating Receipt Circumstantially.
The Following Factors Can Be Probative in Authenticating an Email as
Having Been Received by a Particular Person:
 a reply to the email was received by the sender from the email
address of the purported recipient;
 the subsequent conduct of the recipient reflects his or her knowledge
of the contents of the sent email;
 subsequent communications from the recipient reflect his or her
knowledge of the contents of the sent email;
 the email was received and accessed on a device in the possession
and control of the alleged recipient.
In addition to the factors listed above, a court may take judicial notice 49
of an email, or an email chain when the contents of the email are
authenticated elsewhere. For example, in Shurnas v. Owen, the authors of
the emails in question were not in dispute and the contents of the emails
were “contained in the certified records of the California Department of
Business Oversight.”50 These factors allowed the court to take judicial
notice of the emails the defendant sought to introduce.51
Finally, while it is true that an email may be sent by anyone who, with a
password, gains access to another’s email account, similar questions (of
possible hacking) could be raised with traditional documents. Therefore,
there is no need for separate rules of authenticity for emails. And
importantly, the mere fact that hacking, etc., is possible is not enough to
exclude an email or any other form of digital evidence. As discussed above,
if the mere possibility of electronic alteration were enough to exclude the
evidence, then no digital evidence could ever be authenticated.52

49
50

Judicial notice is discussed more broadly infra Part III.
No. 2:15-cv-00908-MCE-KJN, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18640, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 16,

2016).
51

Id. at *7–8.
See, e.g., In re F.P., 878 A.2d 91, 95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (holding that just as an email can
be faked, a “signature can be forged; a letter can be typed on another’s typewriter; distinct
letterhead stationary can be copied or stolen. We believe that e-mail messages and similar forms
of electronic communication can be properly authenticated within the existing framework of Pa.
R.E. 901 and Pennsylvania case law.”).
52
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B. Text Messages
Text messages are not different in kind from email and so the rules and
guidelines on authentication are similar. Here are some of the relevant
factors for authenticating text messages:53

1. A Witness With Personal Knowledge May Testify to
Authenticity.
Possibilities include:
 The author of the text in question testifies to its authenticity.
 A witness testifies that s/he saw the text in question being authored/
received by the person who the proponent claims authored/received
it.54

2. Jury Comparison With Other Authenticated Texts.
3. Production in Discovery.
4. Establishing That an Electronic System of Recordation
Records Accurately.
This process of illustration, authorized by Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(9),55 can
be useful if the objection to authenticity is that the original text has been
altered in some way. For example, in United States v. Kilpatrick, the
government sought to authenticate text messages sent from two SkyTel

53

The case law cited under the various factors discussed in the section on emails should be
equally useful as supportive citations for the similar (or identical) factors supporting
authentication of texts.
54
United States v. Ramirez, 658 Fed. Appx. 949, 952 (11th Cir. 2016) (admitting photos that
were sent by text message because the recipient of the text message testified she received them, an
agent testified he was present when the text messages were sent, and the defendant was listed as
the owner of the phone number sending the messages); United States v. Barnes, 803 F.3d 209, 217
(5th Cir. 2015) (finding that government laid a proper foundation to authenticate Facebook and
text messages as having been sent by the defendant; the defendant was a quadriplegic, but the
witness who received the messages testified she had seen the defendant use Facebook, she
recognized his Facebook account, and the Facebook messages matched the defendant’s manner of
communicating: “[a]lthough she was not certain that Hall [the defendant] authored the messages,
conclusive proof of authenticity is not required for admission of disputed evidence”).
55
FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9).
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pages, each belonging to one of the defendants respectively.56 A SkyTel
records-custodian verified that the text messages the government offered
had not been and could not be edited in any way because when the
messages are sent from the devices belonging to the defendants, they are
automatically saved on SkyTel’s server with no capacity for editing.57 The
court ruled that this showing was sufficient, under Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(9),
to establish authenticity over a claim that the messages had been altered.58
It should be noted that the showing as to the process or system in
Kilpatrick will be able to be made by a certificate of the foundation
witness—substituting for live testimony—under an amendment to the
Evidence Rules that is scheduled to take effect on December 1, 2017.59

5. Circumstantial Evidence.
a. Authenticating Authorship Circumstantially.
The Inclusion of Some or All of the Following in a Text Can Be
Sufficient to Authenticate the Text as Having Been Sent by a Particular
Person:
 the purported author’s ownership of the phone or other device from
which the text was sent;60
 the author’s possession of the phone;
 the author’s known phone number;
 the author’s name;
 the author’s nickname;61
 the author’s initials;
56

No. 10-20403, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110166, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 7, 2012).
Id. at *4, *8–9.
58
Id. at *16.
59
The proposed amendments would add two new subdivisions to Rule 902, which provides
for various forms of self-authentication. See infra Part V for a full discussion of the use to which
these new proposals can be put.
60
United States v. Mebrtatu, 543 F. App’x 137, 140–41 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that when
phone was in the purported sender’s possession; phone contains texts sent to and signed with the
purported author’s first name, including texts from her boyfriend professing love and other texts
whose content links them to her; texts sufficiently authenticated as hers).
61
Kilpatrick, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110166, at *11–12 (outlining a number of distinctive
characteristics that established the authenticity of the pager and cellphone text messages at issue;
among these factors were the defendants’ use of their names (Kilpatrick) and nicknames (“Zeke”
or “Zizwe”) to sign the messages they sent).
57
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the author’s moniker;
the author’s name as stored on the recipient’s phone;
the author’s customary use of emoji or emoticons;
the author’s use of the same phone number on other occasions;62
a writing style similar or identical to the purported author’s manner
of writing;
 reference to facts only the purported author or a small subset of
individuals including the purported author would know;
 reference to facts uniquely tied to the author—e.g., contact
information for relatives or loved ones; photos of author or items of
importance to author (e.g., car, pet); author’s personal information,
such as contact information, social security number, etc.; receipt of
messages addressed to the author by name or reference.63
Factors Outside the Content of the Text Itself Can Establish Authenticity
of Authorship Circumstantially. For Example:
 a witness testifies that the author told him to expect a text message
prior to its arrival;
 the purported author acts in accordance with a text exchange;
 the purported author orally repeats the contents soon after the text
message is sent or discusses the contents with a third party.

62

See United States v. Fults, 639 F. App’x 366, 373 (6th Cir. 2016) (upholding the admission
of text messages when the recipient testified he communicated with the defendant using that
phone number many times).
63
United States v. Benford, No. CR-14-321-D, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17046, at *16–17
(W.D. Okla. Feb. 12, 2015) (noting that in establishing that text messages from a device were
authored by the defendant, the prosecution pointed to evidence that contact information for the
defendant’s brother and girlfriend were saved on the phone and that incoming messages addressed
the defendant by name) (citing United States v. Ellis, No. 12-CR-20228, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
73031, at *3–4 (E.D. Mich. May 23, 2013) (holding that the defendant’s possession of a cellphone
that received messages addressed to him by name or moniker was, among other circumstantial
evidence (such as his possession of the device), sufficient to establish that he was the author of
outgoing text messages from the same phone)).
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b. Authenticating Receipt Circumstantially.
The Following Factors Can Be Probative in Authenticating a Text as
Having Been Received by a Particular Person:
 a reply to the text message was received by the sender from the
purported recipient’s phone number;
 the subsequent conduct of the recipient reflects his or her knowledge
of the sent message’s contents;
 subsequent communications from the recipient reflect his or her
knowledge of the contents of the sent text message;
 the text message was received and accessed on a device in the
possession and control of the alleged recipient.

C. Chatroom and Other Social Media Conversations
By definition, chatroom postings and other social media
communications are made by third parties, not the owner of the site.
Further, chatroom participants usually use screen names (pseudonyms)
rather than their real names. Thus the authenticity challenge is to provide
enough information for a juror to believe that the chatroom entry or other
social media communication is made by a particular person.
Simply to show that a posting appears on a particular user’s webpage is
insufficient to authenticate the post as one written by the account holder.64
Third party posts, too, must be authenticated by more than the names of the
purported authors reflected on the posts.65
Evidence sufficient to attribute a social media or chat room posting to a
particular individual may include, for example:
 testimony from a witness who identifies the social media account as
that of the alleged author, on the basis that the witness on other
occasions communicated with the account holder;
 testimony from a participant in the conversation based on firsthand
knowledge that the transcript fairly and accurately captures the
conversation;66

64

See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 555 (D. Md. 2007).
See id. at 556.
66
See, e.g., United States v. Lebowitz, 676 F.3d 1000, 1009 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding that
internet chat was authenticated by credible testimony of one participant); United States v. Lundy,
676 F.3d 444, 453 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that testimony by one party to chat that the chats are as
he recorded them is enough to meet the low threshold for authentication); United States v. Barlow,
65
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 evidence that the purported author used the same screen name on
other occasions;
 evidence that the purported author acted in accordance with the
posting (e.g., when a meeting with that person was arranged in a
chat room conversation, he or she attended);
 evidence that the purported author identified himself or herself as the
individual using the screen name;
 an admission that the computer account containing the chat is that of
the purported author;67
 use in the conversation of the customary signature, nickname, or
emoticon associated with the purported author;
 disclosure in the conversation of particularized information that is
either unique to the purported author or known only to a small
group including the purported author;
 evidence that the purported author had in his or her possession
information given to the person using the screen name;
 evidence from the hard drive of the purported author’s computer
reflecting that a user of the computer used the screen name in
question;
 evidence that the chat appears on the computer or other device of the
account owner and purported author; and
 evidence that the purported author elsewhere discussed the same
subject matter.
Authentication as Business Records?
Note that an attempt to authenticate social media messaging as business
records will, of necessity, be limited to the timestamps, metadata, etc.
maintained by the owner. The content of the messages themselves will not
qualify as business records (because the content is supplied by a person
outside the business with no duty to report accurately) and, accordingly, the
content cannot be authenticated as business records under Rule 902(11). For

568 F.3d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 2009) (“English, as the other participant in the year-long
‘relationship,’ had direct knowledge of the chats. Her testimony could sufficiently authenticate the
chat log presented at trial . . . .”).
67
United States v. Manning, 738 F.3d 937, 943 (8th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he government presented
testimony of a law enforcement officer who helped to execute the search warrant, and the officer
testified that the defendant admitted adopting the username ‘mem659’ for his computer account.
The username for his computer account was the same one used in some of the chats.”).
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example, in United States v. Browne, the government contended that
Browne engaged in incriminating conversations over Facebook
Messenger.68 The government sought to authenticate the records with a
certificate of a records custodian of Facebook.69 The custodian certified that
the records “were made and kept by the automated systems of Facebook in
the course of regularly conducted activity as a regular practice of
Facebook . . . .”70 The court held correctly that this showing was insufficient
to authenticate the messages as having come from the defendant—whether
the defendant made the communications involved another level of hearsay,
and the custodian had no personal knowledge of the authorship of the
messages.71 Thus, the certificate could authenticate only the fact that the
message was sent at a certain time from one address to another.72

D. Internet, Websites, Etc.
Websites present authenticity issues because they are dynamic. If the
issue is what is on the website at the time the evidence is being proffered,
then there are no authenticity questions because the court and the parties
can simply access the site and see what the website says.73 But proving up

68

834 F.3d 403, 405 (3d Cir. 2016).
Id. at 408.
70
Id. at 406.
71
Id. at 409–11.
72
The Browne court held, however, that any error in admitting the records with an inadequate
authentication was harmless, because there was sufficient extrinsic evidence to authenticate
Browne as the author of the messages: the people that he communicated with testified at trial
consistently with the communications; Browne “made significant concessions that served to link
him to the Facebook conversations”; the content of the conversation indicated facts about the
sender that linked to Browne; and the government “supported the accuracy of the chat logs by
obtaining them directly from Facebook and introducing a certificate attesting to their maintenance
by the company’s automated systems.” Id. at 413–14.
73
Bellin & Ferguson, supra note 26, at 1157 (“It is hard to imagine many good faith disputes
about whether proffered evidence really is a page from Google Maps or WebMD. Malfeasance
would be foolish. The opposing party can simply go to the website to verify its authenticity, and if
fraud is detected, the consequences for the offering party are dire.”); see also Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A. v. Wrights Mill Holdings, LLC, 127 F. Supp. 3d 156, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (confirming that
authenticity of existing website information could be determined by conducting a “basic Internet
search”).
69
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historic information on the website raises the issue of whether the
information was actually posted as the proponent says it was.74

1. Rule 901 Authentication Standards as Applied to Dynamic
Website Information.
In applying Rule 901 authentication standards to website evidence, there
are three questions that must be answered:
 What was actually on the website?
 Does the exhibit or testimony accurately reflect it?
 If so, is it attributable to the owner of the site?
A sufficient showing of authenticity of dynamic website information is
usually found if a witness testifies—or certifies in compliance with a
statute or rule—that:
 the witness typed in the Internet address reflected on the exhibit on
the date and at the time stated;
 the witness logged onto the website and reviewed its contents; and
 the exhibit fairly and accurately reflects what the witness
perceived.75
74

See, e.g., Adobe Sys. v. Christenson, No. 2:10-cv-00422-LRH-GWF, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16977, at *28–29 (D. Nev. Feb. 7, 2011) (“Although Defendants can probably determine,
with little difficulty, whether a current Google search for the search terms ‘software surplus’
provides links on the first page [of a website], this would not prove that such a search would have
resulted in such a link at a prior point in time.”).
75
See, e.g., Summit Auto Sales, Inc. v. Draco, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-00736-KOB, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21643, at *17–18 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 23, 2016) (allowing screenshots of websites
because a witness had personally reviewed the screenshots and could verify that they were
accurate, and noting that the copyright date on the website and the web address helped
authenticate the document); Rivera v. Inc. Vill. of Farmingdale, 29 F. Supp. 3d 121, 131–32
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (involving internet postings offered to show community bias in Fair Housing Act
case; testimony that witness “personally ‘downloaded all of the postings and confirmed the
identities of the key posters’ . . . [suffices to show] a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that they were
actually posted on the internet by members of an online community comprised of the Village’s
own residents”); Estate of Konell v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 3:10-cv-955-ST, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10183, at *3 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2014) (“To authenticate a printout of a web page, the
proponent must offer evidence that: (1) the printout accurately reflects the computer image of the
web page as of a specified date; (2) the website where the posting appears is owned or controlled
by a particular person or entity; and (3) the authorship of the web posting is reasonably
attributable to that person or entity.”); Buzz Off Insect Shield, LLC v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc.,
606 F. Supp. 2d 571, 594 (M.D.N.C. 2009) (“[Defendant] could authenticate its printouts of
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The exhibit should bear the Internet address and the date and time the
webpage was accessed and the contents downloaded.76
When Evaluating the Proffer, the Court May Consider the Following
Factors as Circumstantial Indications that the Information Was Posted by
the Owner of the Site, Under Rule 901(b)(4):
 distinctive website design, logos, photos, or other images associated
with the website or its owner;77
 the contents of the webpage are of a type ordinarily posted on that
website or websites of similar people or entities;
 the owner of the website has elsewhere published the same contents,
in whole or in part;
 the contents of the webpage have been republished elsewhere and
attributed to the website; and
 the length of time the contents were posted on the website.
Other Possible Means of Authenticating Website Postings Are as
Follows:
 testimony of a witness who created or is in charge of maintaining the
website. That witness may testify on the basis of personal
knowledge that the printout of a webpage came from the site.78
 a printout obtained from the Internet Archive’s “Wayback Machine.”
The Internet Archive documents and stores all websites and the
“Wayback Machine” can retrieve website information from any

various websites by calling witnesses who could testify that they viewed and printed the
information, or supervised others in doing so, and that the printouts were accurate representations
of what was displayed on the listed website on the listed day and time.”).
76
See, e.g., ForeWord Magazine, Inc. v. OverDrive Inc., No. 1:10-cv-1144, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 125373, at *8–11 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2011) (admitting screenshots from websites,
accompanied only by the sworn affidavit of an attorney, given “other indicia of reliability (such as
the Internet domain address and the date of printout)”).
77
See, e.g., Metcalf v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., No. 3:11-cv-1305-ST, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 109641, at *28–29 (D. Or. Aug. 5, 2013) (establishing authenticity of website
information of an organization’s purported website by logos or headers matching those of the
organization).
78
St. Luke’s Cataract & Laser Inst., P.A. v. Sanderson, No. 8:06-cv-223-T-MSS, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 28873, at *5 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2006) (holding that web master’s testimony can
authenticate a printout).
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particular time.79 Some courts require a witness from the Internet
archive to testify to establish that the “Wayback Machine” employs
a process that produces accurate results under Rule 901(b)(9).80
Other courts, as discussed infra, take judicial notice of the
reliability of the “Wayback Machine.”81
The opponent of the evidence is free to challenge authenticity of
dynamic website data by adducing facts showing that the exhibit does not
accurately reflect the contents of a website, or that those contents are not
attributable to the ostensible owner of the site. There may be legitimate
questions concerning the ownership of the site or attribution of statements
contained on the site to the ostensible owner.

2. Self-Authenticating Website Data.
Under Fed. R. Evid. 902, three types of webpage exhibits are selfauthenticating—meaning that a presentation of the item itself is sufficient to
withstand an authenticity objection from the opponent.82
79

Another example of a website that allows users to access archival copies of webpages is
www.cachedpages.com, which allows users to employ one interface to search three different
archival services—the Wayback Machine, Google Cache, and Coral Cache.
80
Compare Telewizja Polska USA, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., No. 02 C 3293, 2004 WL
2367740, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 2004) (approving the use of the Internet Archive’s “Wayback
Machine” to authenticate websites as they appeared on various dates relevant to the litigation),
with Open Text S.A. v. Box, Inc., No. 13-cv-04910-JD, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11312, at *7 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 30, 2015) (refusing to accept a screenshot from the Wayback Machine into evidence
without testimony from a representative of the Internet Archive confirming its authenticity).
Under a proposed amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence, the reliability of the Wayback
Machine process could be established by a certificate of the Internet Archive official, rather than
in-court testimony. See Rule 902(13) (proposed Aug. 14, 2015) (allowing proof of authenticity of
electronic information produced by a process leading to an accurate result to be established by the
certificate of a knowledgeable witness). That proposed amendment is scheduled to become
effective on December 1, 2017. See infra Part V.
81
See infra Part IV.
82
The relationship between Rules 901 and 902 is a complicated one. The examples of
authenticity provided in Rule 901(b) essentially are given the same effect as the conditions
establishing self-authentication under Rule 902, i.e., when met, they satisfy the admissibility
standard and the authenticity question becomes a matter of weight for the jury. The only
difference between the examples in Rules 901 and 902 is that in the latter, the factors establishing
authenticity are found on the face of the evidence—no extrinsic evidence is necessary. It is not
obvious that there should be an evidentiary distinction between establishing authenticity through
extrinsic evidence and establishing authenticity on the face of the item. The rules are looking for
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a. Government Websites.
Under Rule 902(5), data on governmental websites are selfauthenticating.83 As discussed below, courts regularly take judicial notice of
these websites.84

b. Newspaper & Periodical Websites.
Under Rule 902(6) (Newspapers and Periodicals), “[p]rinted material
purporting to be a newspaper or periodical” is self-authenticating.85 This
includes online newspaper and periodicals, because Fed. R. Evid. 101(b)(6)
provides that any reference in the Rules to printed material also includes
comparable information in electronic form.86 Thus all newspaper and
periodical material is self-authenticating whether or not it ever appeared in
hard copy.87

c. Websites Certified as Business Records.
Rules 902(11) and (12) render self-authenticating business
(organizational) records that are certified as satisfying Rule 803(6) by “the
custodian or another qualified witness.”88 Exhibits extracted from websites
that are maintained by, for, and in the ordinary course of, a business or
other regularly conducted activity can satisfy this rule.89
the same thing—enough evidence to indicate to a reasonable person that the item is what the
proponent says it is—and it doesn’t seem that the location of that evidence should be important to
the court. Put another way, the factors in Rule 902 could have just been added to the list of factors
in Rule 901(b) without any loss of utility. That said, the distinction exists in the Evidence Rules,
and so this article follows that structure.
83
See, e.g., Williams v. Long, 585 F. Supp. 2d 679, 686–88, 688 n.4 (D. Md. 2008)
(collecting cases indicating that postings on government websites are self-authenticating).
84
See infra Part IV.
85
FED. R. EVID. 902(6).
86
Id. 101(b)(6) (definitions) (“[A] reference to any kind of written material or any other
medium includes electronically stored information.”).
87
See, e.g., White v. City of Birmingham, 96 F. Supp. 3d 1260, 1274 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 27,
2015) as amended (May 27, 2015) (noting sua sponte that news articles from Huntsville Times
website (AL.com) “could be found self-authenticating at trial”).
88
FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
89
See, e.g., United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 132–34 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that
Facebook posts, including YouTube videos, were self-authenticating under Rule 902(11) where
accompanied by certificates from Facebook and Google custodians “verifying that the Facebook
pages and YouTube videos had been maintained as business records in the course of regularly
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3. Authenticating the Date That Information Is Posted on a
Website.
In some cases, a party may need to show not only that a posting was
made on a website, but also the date on which the information was
generated—this can be a distinct question from establishing what the
website looked like at a particular time, which can be shown by the
methods discussed above. Assume, for example, that a video is posted on
YouTube on January 1, 2016. If the proponent wants to prove simply that it
was posted on that day, this can be done by a person with knowledge,
circumstantial evidence, etc. It is a different question if the proponent needs
to show that the information itself was generated on a certain day. That will
not be shown by proving it was posted on a certain date. For example, in
Sublime v. Sublime Remembered, the plaintiffs brought suit against the
defendant for violating a court order prohibiting defendant from performing
songs belonging to the plaintiffs.90 As evidence, the plaintiffs sought to
admit a YouTube video of the defendant performing the prohibited music.91
The court ruled that the video was not properly authenticated without
evidence that it was recorded after the court order was issued.92 The mere
fact that it was posted after the court order was issued was not enough to
establish that the video was what the proponent said it was—performance
of the music after the court order was entered.93
Establishing that a video (or any other kind of information posted on a
website) was prepared on—or before or after—a certain date thus presents
a separate question of authenticity. But it is a question that can be addressed
through the same factors discussed above: for example, by a person with
personal knowledge, a forensic expert, and/or circumstantial evidence.
Illustrative is United States v. Broomfield, in which the defendant was
convicted of felon-firearm possession.94 The government offered a
YouTube video, which showed the defendant discharging an AR-15 rifle in
conducted business activities”); Randazza v. Cox, No. 2:12-cv-2040-JAD-PAL, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 49762, at *11 (D. Nev. Apr. 10, 2014) (stating that videos posted to YouTube “are selfauthenticating as a certified domestic record of a regular conducted activity if their proponent
satisfies the requirements of the business-records hearsay exception”).
90
No. CV 06-6059 CAS (FMOx), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103813, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 22,
2013).
91
Id. at *8.
92
Id. at *10–11.
93
Id. at *10 (emphasis added).
94
591 F. App’x 847, 848 (11th Cir. 2014).
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front of Fowler Firearms.95 The date that the video was made was obviously
critical.96 If it was made before the defendant was a convicted felon, then it
depicted no crime.97 The government was not required, necessarily, to prove
that the video was taken on a specific day, but it was required to establish
that the video was taken after the defendant was convicted of a felony.98
And the date that the video was posted on YouTube was not the relevant
date.99 The court found the date was properly authenticated given the
following circumstances:
 “Fowler Firearms’s manager [] testified that Broomfield was a
Fowler Firearms member, that on January 21, 2011, Broomfield
purchased two boxes of PMC .223 ammunition, and that he had not
purchased that ammunition at any other time. [The manager] stated
that the only firearm Fowler Firearms rented to customers at the
time that used PMC .223 ammunition was the AR–15 rifle.”100
 An employee who had worked at Fowler Firearms for ten years
“testified that he could discern the approximate date the video was
taken.”101 He “explained that the video showed side deflectors and
lights on the gun range, which Fowler Firearms had installed in late
2010 or early 2011.”102 He also testified that Fowler Firearms
“paints its floors and walls at the beginning of the season, and the
freshly-painted floor and walls seen in the video indicated that the
footage was filmed close to the start of 2011.”103
 A witness who “operated a maintenance business that provided
repair and maintenance to Fowler Firearms . . . testified that he
installed the lighted baffles shown in the video, in late September or
early October of 2010.”104

95

Id.
See id. at 849.
97
See id. at 848.
98
See id.
99
See id. at 849.
100
Id. at 848–49.
101
Id. at 849.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
96
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All this was more than enough to indicate that the video was taken
around the beginning of 2011—post-dating the defendant’s felony status—
and so depicted the crime of felon-firearm possession.105

E. Social Media Postings
“Social media” is defined as “forms of electronic communication
([such] as Websites) . . . through which users create online communities to
share information, ideas, personal messages, and other content . . . .”106
Parties have increasingly sought to use social media evidence to their
advantage at trial. A common example would be a picture or entry posted
on a person’s Facebook page, that could be relevant to contradict that
person’s testimony at trial. If the entry is challenged for authenticity, the
proponent must present a prima facie case that the evidence is what the
party says it is—e.g., that it is in fact a posting on the person’s Facebook
page. If the goal is to prove that the page or a post is that of a particular
person, authenticity standards are not automatically satisfied by the fact that
the post or the page is in that person’s name, or that the person is pictured
on the post.107 That is because someone can create a Facebook or other

105

Id.
Social Media, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictio
nary/social%20media (last visited January 16, 2016).
107
See, e.g., United States v. Vayner, 769 F.3d 125, 132 (2d Cir. 2014), where the court held
that a page on the Russian version of Facebook was not sufficiently authenticated simply by the
fact that it bore the name and picture of the purported “owner” Zhyltsou:
106

It is uncontroverted that information about Zhyltsou appeared on the VK page: his
name, photograph, and some details about his life consistent with Timku’s testimony
about him. But there was no evidence that Zhyltsou himself had created the page or was
responsible for its contents. Had the government sought to introduce, for instance, a
flyer found on the street that contained Zhyltsou’s Skype address and was purportedly
written or authorized by him, the district court surely would have required some
evidence that the flyer did, in fact, emanate from Zhyltsou. Otherwise, how could the
statements in the flyer be attributed to him?
Id. Essentially the court in Vayner held that a Facebook page is not self-authenticating. But see
United States v. Encarnacion-LaFontaine, 639 F. App’x 710, 713 (2d Cir. 2016) (finding that
threatening Facebook posts were properly authenticated where “the Government introduced
evidence that (1) the Facebook accounts used to send the messages were accessed from IP
addresses connected to computers near Encarnacion’s apartment; (2) patterns of access to the
accounts show that they were controlled by the same person; (3) in addition to the Goris threats,
the accounts were used to send messages to other individuals connected to Encarnacion;
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social media page in someone else’s name. Moreover, one person may also
gain access to another’s account.
What more must be done to establish authenticity of a social media
page? Most courts have found that it is enough for the proponent to show
that the pages and accounts can be tracked through Internet protocol
addresses associated with the person who purportedly made the post.108
Other Factors That Can be Relied Upon to Support Authentication of
Social Media Postings Include the Following:109
 testimony from the purported creator of the social network profile
and related postings;
 testimony from persons who saw the purported creator establish or
post to the page;
 testimony of a witness that she often communicated with the alleged
creator of the page through that account;110
 expert testimony concerning the results of a search of the social
media account holder’s computer hard drive;111

(4) Encarnacion had a motive to make the threats[;] and (5) a limited number of people, including
Encarnacion, had information that was contained in the messages”).
108
United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 133 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting Facebook pages purportedly maintained by two of the
defendants; the trial court properly “determined that the prosecution had satisfied its burden under
Rule 901(a) by tracking the Facebook pages and Facebook accounts to Hassan’s and Yaghi’s
email addresses via internet protocol addresses”); United States v. Brinson, 772 F.3d 1314, 1321
(10th Cir. 2014) (Facebook account linked to the defendant’s email).
109
See Hon. Paul W. Grimm, Lisa Yurwit Bergstrom & Melissa M. O’Toole-Loureiro,
Authentication of Social Media Evidence, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 433, 444–55 (2013); Richard
Raysman & Peter Brown, Authentication of Social Media Evidence, N.Y. L.J. (Nov. 8, 2011),
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202528306317/Authentication-of-Social-MediaEvidence.
110
United States v. Browne, 834 F.3d 403, 411–14 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that Facebook
chats were sufficiently authenticated because witnesses testified they communicated with the
creator of the page through Facebook, they could identify the alleged creator of the page in court,
and the available biographical data on Facebook matched the defendant).
111
Grimm, et al., supra note 109, at 469 (“A computer forensic expert can frequently
authenticate the maker of social media content. Obviously, you will need to retain the proper
expert and ensure that he or she has enough time and information to make the identification.
Advance planning is essential, and be mindful of the potentially substantial cost.” (citation
omitted)).
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 testimony about the contextual clues and distinctive aspects in the
messages themselves tending to reveal the identity of the purported
author;
 testimony regarding the account holder’s exclusive access to the
originating computer and social media account;
 information from the social media network that links the page or
post to the purported author;
 testimony directly from the social networking website that connects
the establishment of the profile to the person who allegedly created
it and also connects the posting sought to be introduced to the
person who initiated it;
 expert testimony regarding how social network accounts are
accessed and what methods are used to prevent unauthorized
access;
 production pursuant to a document request;
 whether the purported author knows the password to the account,
and how many others know it as well;
 that the page or post contains some of the factors previously
discussed as circumstantial evidence of authenticity of texts, emails,
etc., including:
- nonpublic details of the purported author’s life;
- other items known uniquely to the purported author or a
small group including him or her;
- references or links to, or contact information about, loved
ones, relatives, co-workers, others close to the purported
author;
- photos and videos likely to be accessed by the purported
author;
- biographical information, nicknames, not generally
accessible;
- the structure or style of comments that are in the style of
the purported author;
- that the purported author acts in accordance with the
contents of the page or post.
Finally, a social media post meeting the foundational requirements of a
business record under Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) may be self-authenticating
through a certificate of a foundation witness under 902(11). While this may
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not be enough to authenticate the identity of the person posting, it will be
enough to establish that the records were not altered in any way after they
were posted.112

IV. JUDICIAL NOTICE OF DIGITAL EVIDENCE
This article has discussed the many ways that new forms of digital
evidence might be authenticated. Almost all of these methods require
expenditure of resources. Courts and parties have begun to realize that some
of this new digital evidence has reached the point of being an undisputed
means of proving a fact. In these circumstances, judicial notice may be used
to alleviate the expenditure of resources toward authentication.
Under Fed. R. Evid. 201(b), a court may judicially notice a fact if it is
not subject to reasonable dispute.113 An example of a court taking judicial
notice of a fact obtained through an electronic process is found in United
States v. Brooks.114 The defendant in a bank robbery prosecution challenged
the admissibility of GPS data that was obtained from a GPS tracker that the
teller placed in the envelope of stolen money.115 The trial court took judicial
notice of the accuracy and reliability of GPS technology.116 The court of
appeals found no error:
We cannot conclude that the district court abused its
discretion in taking judicial notice of the accuracy and
reliability of GPS technology. Commercial GPS units are
widely available, and most modern cell phones have GPS
tracking capabilities. Courts routinely rely on GPS
technology to supervise individuals on probation or
supervised release, and, in assessing the Fourth
112

An example of a sufficient showing that the records were not altered was provided by the
court in United States v. Hassan:
[T]he government presented the certifications of records custodians of Facebook and
Google, verifying that the Facebook pages and YouTube videos had been maintained as
business records in the course of regularly conducted business activities. According to
those certifications, Facebook and Google create and retain such pages and videos when
(or soon after) their users post them through use of the Facebook or Google servers.
E.g., 742 F.3d at 133.
113
FED. R. EVID. 201(b).
114
715 F.3d 1069, 1077–78 (8th Cir. 2013).
115
Id.
116
Id.
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Amendment constraints associated with GPS tracking,
courts generally have assumed the technology’s
accuracy.117
Another common example of judicial notice of digital information is
that courts take judicial notice of distances, locations, and the physical
contours of an area by reference to Google Maps.118
What follows are some examples of judicial notice of digital
information.
1. Government Websites. Judicial notice may be taken of postings on
government websites,119 including:
 Federal, state, and local court websites;120
 Federal, state, and local agency, department and other entities’
websites;121
117

Id. at 1078.
See, e.g., United States v. Burroughs, 810 F.3d 833, 835 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“We grant
the government’s motion to take judicial notice of a Google map. It is a ‘source[] whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned,’ at least for the purpose of identifying the area where Burroughs
was arrested and the general layout of the block.” (alteration in original) (citing FED. R. EVID.
201(b))); McCormack v. Hiedeman, 694 F.3d 1004, 1008 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (relying on Google
Maps to determine the distance between two cities; the court held that Google Maps was a website
whose accuracy could not reasonably be questioned under FED. R. EVID. 201(b)(2)); see also
Cline v. City of Mansfield, 745 F. Supp. 2d 773, 801 n.23 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (taking judicial notice
that the sun set at 7:47 pm on a particular date according to www.timeanddate.com); but see
Wilbon v. Plovanich, No. 12 C 1132, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30333, at *31–32 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 9,
2016) (withholding judicial notice of a Google Map because the plaintiffs marked the map with a
description of the defendant’s alleged route, and the foundation for the route needs to be laid at
trial).
119
United States v. Head, No. 08-CR-116 KJM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151805, at *7 n.2
(E.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2013) (“The court may take judicial notice of information posted on
government websites as it can be ‘accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned.’”); Puerto Rico v. Shell Oil Co. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl
Ether “MTBE” Prods. Liab. Litig.), No. 1:00-1898, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181837, at *16
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2013) (“Courts routinely take judicial notice of data on government websites
because it is presumed authentic and reliable.”).
120
Thatcher v. OakBend Med. Ctr., No. H-14-3551, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 641, at *11 (S.D.
Tex. Jan. 5, 2016) (holding that an ordinance taken from a city’s official website is selfauthenticating and subject to judicial notice); Feingold v. Graff, 516 F. App’x 223, 226 (3d Cir.
2013).
121
See, e.g., United States v. Iverson, 818 F.3d 1015, 1022 (10th Cir. 2016) (noting that
“courts have considered the FDIC website so reliable that they have taken judicial notice of
118
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 Foreign government websites;122
 International organization websites.123
2. Non-Government Websites. Generally, courts are reluctant to take
judicial notice of non-governmental websites because the Internet “is an
open source” permitting “[a]nyone [to] purchase an internet address and
create a website[]” and so the information recorded is subject to dispute.124
A few websites, however, as discussed above, have become a part of daily
life—their accuracy is both objectively verifiable and actually verified
millions of times a day. Other websites are the online versions of sources
that courts have taken judicial notice of for years, and the courts find little
reason to distinguish a reputable web equivalent from a reputable hard copy
edition.
Examples of Information Found Authentic on Non-Governmental
Websites Through Judicial Notice.
 Internet maps (e.g., Google Maps, MapQuest);125
 Calendar information;126
 Newspaper and periodical articles;127

information on it” (citing Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Blackmore Sewer Constr., Inc., 298 F.3d
600, 607 (7th Cir. 2002))); Lawrence v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. A-13-CV-913 LY,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40012, at *34 n.6 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2015) (federal government’s
agreement with national bank as posted on government website); Flores v. City of Baldwin Park,
No. CV 14-9290-MWF(JCx), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22149, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2015)
(municipal police department website); FAS Capital, LLC v. Carr, 7 F. Supp. 3d 1259, 1266–67
(N.D. Ga. 2014); Curcio v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., No. 09-CV-1498-IEG (NLS), 2009 WL
3320499, at *2, *3–4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2009).
122
See, e.g., United States v. Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265, 296 n.32 (2d Cir. 2012) (websites of
governments of Vietnam and Brazil).
123
See, e.g., Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1367 (2013) (World Bank
website).
124
United States v. Kane, No. 2:13-cr-250-JAD-VCF, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154248, at *25
(D. Nev. Oct. 28, 2013).
125
See United States v. Burroughs, 810 F.3d 833, 835 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
126
See, e.g., Tyler v. United States, No. 1:08-CR-165-CC-JSA, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
184007, at *9 n.6 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 6, 2012); Local 282, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Pile Found.
Constr. Co., No. 09-cv-4535(KAM)(LB), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86644, at *17 n.5 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 5, 2011).
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 Online versions of textbooks, dictionaries, rules, charters.128
Most non-governmental websites, even if familiar, are of debatable
authenticity and therefore not appropriately the object of judicial notice.
Wikipedia is a prime example. Courts have declined requests to take
judicial notice of the contents of Wikipedia entries,129 except for the fact
that the contents appear on the site as of a certain date of access.130
3. Wayback Machine. Archived versions of websites as displayed on
the “Wayback Machine” (www.archive.org) are frequently the subject of
judicial notice,131 but this is not always the case.132 Note that it is only the

127
See, e.g., Ford v. Artiga, No. 2:12-CV-02370 KJM-AC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106805, at
*19 n.5 (E.D. Cal. July 30, 2013); HB v. Monroe Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 11-CV-5881
(CS), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141252, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2012).
128
See, e.g., Shuler v. Garrett, 743 F.3d 170, 173 (6th Cir. 2014) (Oxford English Dictionary);
United States v. Mosley, 672 F.3d 586, 591 (8th Cir. 2012) (Physicians’ Desk Reference); Morgan
Stanley Smith Barney LLC v. Monaco, No. 14-cv-00275-RM-MJW, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
149419, at *5 (D. Colo. Aug. 26, 2014) (FINRA rules); Dealer Comput. Servs. v. Monarch Ford,
No. 1:12-CV-01970-LJO-SKO, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11237, at *11 n.3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25,
2013) (American Arbitration Association rules); Famous Music Corp. v. 716 Elmwood, Inc., No.
05-CV-0885A(M), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96789, at *13 n.7 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2007) (Articles
of Association of ASCAP).
129
See, e.g., Stein v. Bennett, No. 2:12-CV-42-WKW [WO], 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126667,
at *20–21 n.10 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 5, 2013) (stating that “Wikipedia is not a source that warrants
judicial notice”); Blanks v. Cate, No. 2:11-cv-0171 WBS CKD P, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11233,
at *8 n.4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2013) (refusing to take judicial notice of a Wikipedia entry “as such
information is not sufficiently reliable”); Gonzales v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 861 F. Supp. 2d
1099, 1104 n.4 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (“The Court declines Plaintiff’s request to take judicial notice of
the Wikipedia definition of Parkinson’s Disease because the internet is not typically a reliable
source of information.”).
130
See, e.g., McCrary v. Elations Co., LLC, No. EDCV 13-00242 JGB (OPx), 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8443, at *3 n.3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2014) (“While the court may take judicial notice of the
fact that the internet, Wikipedia, and journal articles are available to the public, it may not take
judicial notice of the truth of the matters asserted therein.”).
131
See, e.g., O’Toole v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 499 F.3d 1218, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007)
(requiring that the district court take judicial notice of the contents gathered from the Wayback
Machine and holding that the district court “abused its discretion” in failing to take judicial notice
of the website (emphasis added)); Marten Transp., Ltd. v. PlattForm Adver., Inc., No. 14-2464JWL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57471, at *7–8 (D. Kan. Apr. 29, 2016) (taking judicial notice of
information retrieved from the Internet Archive after it had been authenticated by an employee of
the Internet Archive); Under a Foot Plant, Co. v. Exterior Design, Inc., No. 6:14-cv-01371-AA,
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contents of the archived pages that may warrant judicial notice—the dates
assigned to archived pages may not apply to images linked to them, and
more generally, links on archived pages may direct to the live web if the
object of the old link is no longer available.

V.

AUTHENTICATING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE BY WAY OF
CERTIFICATION—NEW AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE
A. The Need for Rules to Alleviate the Expense of Authenticating
Electronic Evidence
The Judicial Conference of the United States has approved a proposal
from the Advisory Committee on Evidence to add two new subdivisions to
Rule 902, the rule on self-authentication. The first provision would allow
self-authentication of machine-generated information, upon a submission of
a certification prepared by a qualified person. The second proposal would
provide a similar certification procedure for a copy of data taken from an
electronic device, medium or file. These proposals are analogous to Rules
902(11) and (12) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which permit a
foundation witness to establish the authenticity of business records by way
of certification.133 Barring any unforeseen developments, these new rules
would go into effect on December 1, 2017.134
The proposals have a common goal of making authentication easier for
certain kinds of electronic evidence that are, under current law, likely to be
authenticated under Rule 901 but only by calling a witness to testify to
authenticity. The Advisory Committee concluded that the types of
electronic evidence covered by the two proposed rules are rarely the subject
of a legitimate authenticity dispute, but it has often been the case that the
proponent is nonetheless forced to produce an authentication witness,

2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37596, at *4 (D. Or. Mar. 24, 2015) (“District courts have routinely taken
judicial notice of content from The Internet Archive”).
132
See, e.g., Open Text S.A. v. Box, Inc., No. 13-cv-04910-JD, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11312, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2015) (finding proffered Wayback Machine printouts not
authenticated absent certification from representative of InternetArchive.org).
133
FED. R. EVID. 902(11)–(12).
134
As of this writing, the rule proposals are currently being reviewed by the Supreme Court.
The Court has until May 1, 2017 to submit the rules to Congress. If Congress then does not act by
December 1, 2017, the proposed amendments will take effect.
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incurring expense and inconvenience—and often, at the last minute,
opposing counsel ends up stipulating to authenticity in any event.
The text of the proposed amendments provides as follows:
Rule 902. Evidence That Is Self-Authenticating
The following items of evidence are selfauthenticating; they require no extrinsic evidence
of authenticity in order to be admitted:
*****
(13) Certified Records Generated by an Electronic
Process or System. A record generated by an
electronic process or system that produces an
accurate result, as shown by a certification of a
qualified person that complies with the certification
requirements of Rule 902(11) or (12). The
proponent must also meet the notice requirements
of Rule 902(11).
(14) Certified Data Copied from an Electronic
Device, Storage Medium, or File. Data copied
from an electronic device, storage medium, or file,
if authenticated by a process of digital
identification, as shown by a certification of a
qualified person that complies with the certification
requirements of Rule 902(11) or (12). The
proponent also must meet the notice requirements
of Rule 902(11).135

B. The Impact of the New Rules
The self-authentication proposals, by following the approach taken in
Rule 902(11) and (12) regarding business records, essentially leave the
burden of going forward on authenticity questions to the opponent of the
135
The references to Rule 902(11) and (12) are to the certification and notice requirements of
those rules—their text is found in supra note 31. Those rules allow a certification to authenticate a
business record under the hearsay exception for such records (i.e., Rule 803(6)). There is no intent
to require, or permit, a certification under these new provisions to prove the requirements of Rule
803(6). Rules 902(13) and (14) are solely limited to authentication and any attempt to satisfy a
hearsay exception must be made independently.
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evidence. Under those rules a business record is authenticated by a
certificate, but the opponent is given “a fair opportunity” to challenge both
the certificate and the underlying record.136 The proposals for new Rules
902(13) and 902(14) would have the same effect of shifting to the opponent
the burden of going forward (not the burden of proof) on authenticity
disputes regarding the described electronic evidence.
These new amendments do not change the standards for authentication
of electronic evidence. Rather, they change the manner in which the
proponent’s submission on authenticity can be made. Instead of calling a
witness, the proponent can provide a certificate prepared by the witness of
the submission that he would have made if required to testify. Of course, if
that submission would be insufficient if he had testified, these new
amendments will be of no use. An insufficient showing of authenticity does
not somehow become better by way of a certificate in lieu of testimony.
The proposals are relatively mild in effect. They provide an easier
method to authenticate but they do not reduce the standards of
authentication. Moreover, a certification under the proposed rules can
establish only that the proffered item has satisfied the admissibility
requirements for authenticity. So the opponent remains free to object to
admissibility on other grounds, such as hearsay. For example, assume that a
plaintiff in a defamation case offers what purports to be a printout of a
webpage on which a defamatory statement was made. Plaintiff offers a
certification in which a qualified person describes the process by which the
webpage was retrieved. Under the rule that certification sufficiently
establishes that the webpage is authentic, if the witness’s testimony at trial
would do so. But the defendant remains free to object that the statement on
the webpage was not placed there by defendant and therefore cannot be
admitted as a party-opponent statement. Similarly, a certification
authenticating a computer output, such as a spreadsheet, does not preclude
an objection that the information produced is unreliable—the authentication
establishes only that the output came from the computer.

C. Overlapping Provisions
It should be noted that there is an overlap in the two provisions. When
data is copied from an electronic device, the result is a record (i.e., the
copy) that is ordinarily generated by an electronic process (because the
copy is generated electronically). So it is true that the electronic information
136

FED. R. EVID. 902(11)–(12).

7 GRIMM, CAPRA, JOSEPH (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

3/23/2017 9:56 AM

AUTHENTICATING DIGITAL EVIDENCE

41

that is covered by Rule 902(14) could also for the most part (but not
completely) be covered by Rule 902(13). The overlap does not run very far
the other way, however; that is, records generated by an electronic system
may well not be a “copy” of anything. The Advisory Committee had a good
reason for proposing a separate subdivision for copies of electronic data,
because the process of authenticating a copy—usually through hash
value137—is unique and specific. Rule 902(14) is in large part directed to a
fairly specific problem—cloning hard drives and offering the clone rather
than the original, through a hash value match. The process of authenticating
machine-generated evidence more broadly can be satisfied by a number of
different methods. Put another way, the copying processes that serve for
authentication under Rule 902(14) do only one thing—assuring that there is
no change between the copy and the original. In contrast, other machinegenerated evidence may involve many more processes, such as evaluating
and processing various inputs, organizing information, and so forth. So the
bottom line is that there is a rational basis for breaking out a small subset of
machine-generated evidence (copying hard drives, phones, and the like) for
individual treatment. In any case, there is no reason to seek to parse out a
distinction between the coverage of the two subsections, as the
requirements for both are exactly the same: a qualified person must file a
certificate establishing authenticity under the same standards that would be
applicable to an in-court witness.

137

The Committee Note to proposed Rule 902(14) provides a description of how a copy of an
electronic file or device can be authenticated by hash value:
A hash value is a number that is often represented as a sequence of characters and is
produced by an algorithm based upon the digital contents of a drive, medium, or file. If
the hash values for the original and copy are different, then the copy is not identical to
the original. If the hash values for the original and copy are the same, it is highly
improbable that the original and copy are not identical. Thus, identical hash values for
the original and copy reliably attest to the fact that they are exact duplicates. This
amendment allows self-authentication by a certification of a qualified person that she
checked the hash value of the proffered item and that it was identical to the original.
The rule is flexible enough to allow certifications through processes other than
comparison of hash value, including by other reliable means of identification provided
by future technology.
See Memorandum from James C. Duff to the Chief Justice of the U.S. and Assoc. Justices of the
Supreme Court 8 (Sept. 28, 2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/pending-rules-andforms-amendments.
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D. Applications of Rules 902(13) and (14)
Here are some illustrative examples of how the new rules can be used to
ameliorate the costs of authenticating electronic evidence:138
Examples of how Rule 902(13) can be used:
1. Proving that a USB device was connected to (i.e., plugged into) a
computer: In a hypothetical civil or criminal case in Chicago, a disputed
issue is whether Devera Hall used her computer to access files stored on a
USB thumb drive owned by a co-worker. Ms. Hall’s computer uses the
Windows operating system, which automatically records information about
every USB device connected to her computer in a database known as the
“Windows registry.” The Windows registry database is maintained on the
computer by the Windows operating system in order to facilitate the
computer’s operations. A forensic technician, located in Dallas, Texas, has
provided a printout from the Windows registry that indicates that a USB
thumb drive, identified by manufacturer, model, and serial number, was last
connected to Ms. Hall’s computer at a specific date and time.
Without Rule 902(13): Without Rule 902(13), the
proponent of the evidence would need to call the forensic
technician who obtained the printout as a witness, in order
to establish the authenticity of the evidence. During his or
her testimony, the forensic technician would typically be
asked to testify about his or her background and
qualifications; the process by which digital forensic
examinations are conducted in general; the steps taken by
the forensic technician during the examination of Ms.
Hall’s computer in particular; the process by which the
Windows operating system maintains information in the
Windows registry, including information about USB
devices connected to the computer; and the steps taken by
the forensic examiner to examine the Windows registry and
to produce the printout identifying the USB device.

138

The authors thank John Haried, who originally proposed these rule amendments at the
Advisory Committee’s Symposium on Electronic Evidence, and who developed these illustrations
in collaboration with the Reporter to the Evidence Rules Committee. See Symposium, supra note
6, at 1192–97.
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Impact of Rule 902(13): With Rule 902(13), the proponent
of the evidence could obtain a written certification from the
forensic technician, stating that the Windows operating
system regularly records information in the Windows
registry about USB devices connected to a computer; that
the process by which such information is recorded produces
an accurate result; and that the printout accurately reflected
information stored in the Windows registry of Ms. Hall’s
computer. The proponent would be required to provide
reasonable written notice of its intent to offer the printout
as an exhibit and to make the written certification and
proposed exhibit available for inspection. If the opposing
party did not dispute the accuracy or reliability of the
process that produced the exhibit, the proponent would not
need to call the forensic technician as a witness to establish
the authenticity of the exhibit. (There are many other
examples of the same types of machine-generated
information on computers, for example, Internet browser
histories and Wi-Fi access logs.)
2. Proving that a server was used to connect to a particular
webpage: Hypothetically, a malicious hacker executed a denial-of-service
attack against Acme’s website. Acme’s server maintained an Internet
Information Services (IIS) log that automatically records information about
every internet connection routed to the web server to view a web page,
including the IP address, webpage, user agent string and what was
requested from the website. The IIS logs reflected repeated access to
Acme’s website from an IP address known to be used by the hacker. The
proponent wants to introduce the IIS log to prove that the hacker’s IP
address was an instrument of the attack.
Without Rule 902(13): The proponent would have to call a
website expert to testify about the mechanics of the server’s
operating system; his search of the IIS log; how the IIS log
works; and that the exhibit is an accurate record of the IIS
log.
With Rule 902(13): The proponent would obtain the
website expert’s certification of the facts establishing
authenticity of the exhibit and provide the certification and
exhibit to the opposing party with reasonable notice that it
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intends to offer the exhibit at trial. If the opposing party
does not timely dispute the reliability of the process that
produced the registry key, then the proponent would not
need to call the website expert to establish authenticity.
3. Proving that a person was or was not near the scene of an event:
Hypothetically, Robert Jackson is a defendant in a civil (or criminal) action
alleging that he was the driver in a hit-and-run collision with a U.S. Postal
Service mail carrier in Atlanta at 2:15 p.m. on March 6, 2015. Mr. Jackson
owns an iPhone, which has software that records machine-generated dates,
times, and GPS coordinates of each picture he takes with his iPhone. Mr.
Jackson’s iPhone contains two pictures of his home in an Atlanta suburb at
about 1 p.m. on March 6. He wants to introduce into evidence the photos
together with the metadata, including the date, time, and GPS coordinates,
recovered forensically from his iPhone to corroborate his alibi that he was
at home several miles from the scene at the time of the collision.
Without Rule 902(13): The proponent would have to call
the forensic technician to testify about Mr. Jackson’s
iPhone’s operating system; his search of the phone; how
the metadata was created and stored with each photograph;
and that the exhibit is an accurate record of the
photographs.
With Rule 902(13): The proponent would obtain the
forensic technician’s certification of the facts establishing
authenticity of the exhibits and provide the certification and
exhibit to the opposing party with reasonable notice that it
intends to offer the exhibit at trial. If the opposing party
does not timely dispute the reliability of the process that
produced the iPhone’s logs, then the proponent would not
have to call the technician to establish authenticity.
4. Proving association and activity between alleged co-conspirators:
Hypothetically, Ian Nichols is charged with conspiracy to commit the
robbery of First National Bank that occurred in San Diego on January 30,
2015. Two robbers drove away in a silver Ford Taurus. The alleged coconspirator was Dain Miller. Dain was arrested on an outstanding warrant
on February 1, 2015, and in his pocket was his Samsung Galaxy phone. The
Samsung phone’s software automatically maintains a log of text messages
that includes the text content, date, time, and number of the other phone
involved. Pursuant to a warrant, forensic technicians examined Dain’s
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phone and located four text messages to Ian’s phone from January 29:
“Meet my house @9”; “Is Taurus the Bull out of shop?”; “Sheri says you
have some blow”; and “see ya tomorrow.” In the separate trial of Ian, the
government wants to offer the four text messages to prove the conspiracy.
Without Rule 902(13): The proponent would have to call
the forensic technician to testify about Dain’s phone’s
operating system; his search of the phone’s text message
log; how logs are created; and that the exhibit is an accurate
record of the iPhone’s logs.
With Rule 902(13): The proponent would obtain the
forensic technician’s certification of the facts establishing
authenticity of the exhibit and provide the certification and
exhibit to the opposing party with reasonable notice that it
intends to offer the exhibit at trial. If the opposing party
does not timely dispute the reliability of the process that
produced the iPhone’s logs, then the court would make the
Rule 104 threshold authenticity finding and admit the
exhibits, absent other proper objection.
Hearsay Objection Retained: Under Rule 902(13), the
opponent—here, criminal defendant Ian—would retain his
hearsay objections to the text messages found on Dain’s
phone. For example, the judge would evaluate the text
“Sheri says you have some blow” under F.R.E.
801(d)(2)(E) to determine whether it was a coconspirator’s
statement during and in furtherance of a conspiracy, and
under F.R.E. 805, to assess the hearsay within hearsay. The
court might exclude the text “Sheri says you have some
blow” under either rule or both.
Example of how Rule 902(14) can be used:
In the armed robbery hypothetical, above, forensic technician Smith
made a forensic copy of Dain’s Samsung Galaxy phone in the field. Smith
verified that the forensic copy was identical to the original phone’s text logs
using an industry standard methodology (e.g., hash value or other means).
Smith gave the copy to forensic technician Jones, who performed his
examination at his lab. Jones used the copy to conduct his entire forensic
examination so that he would not inadvertently alter the data on the phone.
Jones found the text messages. The government wants to offer the copy into
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evidence as part of the basis of Jones’s testimony about the text messages
he found.
Without Rule 902(14): The government would have to call
two witnesses. First, forensic technician Smith would need
to testify about making the forensic copy of information
from Dain’s phone, and about the methodology that he used
to verify that the copy was an exact copy of information
inside the phone. Second, the government would have to
call Jones to testify about his examination.
With Rule 902(14): The proponent would obtain Smith’s
certification of the facts establishing how he copied the
phone’s information and then verified the copy was true
and accurate. Before trial the government would provide
the certification and exhibit to the opposing party – here
defendant Ian—with reasonable notice that it intends to
offer the exhibit at trial. If Ian’s attorney does not timely
dispute the reliability of the process that produced the
Samsung Galaxy’s text message logs, then the proponent
would only call Jones.

E. Certifications of Authenticity of Electronic Evidence and the Right
to Confrontation
1. The Melendez-Diaz Carve-out
In the public comment on these proposed self-authentication rules for
electronic evidence, a group of law professors139 expressed the concern that
Rule 902(13) authorizes certificates that, when introduced into evidence,
would violate the defendant’s right to confrontation under Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts.140 Melendez-Diaz held that a certificate from a lab
indicating a positive result on a test for drugs (found in the defendant’s car)
violated the defendant’s right to confrontation because the certificate was
prepared solely for purposes of trial and therefore was “testimonial.”141 The

139

See Public Comment from Richard Friedman, B.C. French, N.M. Garland, L. Kirkpatrick,
F.I. Lederer, T.A. Martin, I. Meyn, R.C. Park, as individuals, 2015-EV-0003-0197,
https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=USC-RULES-EV-2015-0003.
140
Id. at 1, 2–4.
141
Melendez-Diaz v. Mass., 557 U.S. 305, 310–11 (2009).
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Court in Crawford v. Washington held that if hearsay is “testimonial” its
admission violates the right to confrontation unless the defendant has the
right to cross-examine the declarant.142
It would seem like a certificate of authenticity would be testimonial as
well, because it would by definition be prepared for purposes of a trial. But
it is not that simple, because the Melendez-Diaz Court carved out certain
certificates from the constitutional proscription. The heart of the
confrontation question, as applied to certificates of authenticity, is a passage
in Melendez-Diaz in which the majority was responding to the dissent’s
argument that certificates of authenticity were admitted at common law,
even though they would have fit the majority’s new-found definition of
testimoniality (and thus that the majority was wrong in its assertion that its
limitations on testimonial hearsay were historically-grounded). Here is that
passage from Melendez-Diaz:
The dissent identifies a single class of evidence which,
though prepared for use at trial, was traditionally
admissible: a clerk’s certificate authenticating an official
record—or a copy thereof—for use as evidence. But a
clerk’s authority in that regard was narrowly circumscribed.
He was permitted “to certify to the correctness of a copy of
a record kept in his office,” but had “no authority to
furnish, as evidence for the trial of a lawsuit, his
interpretation of what the record contains or shows, or to
certify to its substance or effect.” The dissent suggests that
the fact that this exception was “narrowly circumscribed”
makes no difference. To the contrary, it makes all the
difference in the world. It shows that even the line of cases
establishing the one narrow exception the dissent has been
able to identify simultaneously vindicates the general rule
applicable to the present case. A clerk could by affidavit
authenticate or provide a copy of an otherwise admissible
record, but could not do what the analysts did here: create a
record for the sole purpose of providing evidence against a
defendant.143

142
143

541 U.S. 36, 74 (2004).
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 322–23 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

7 GRIMM, CAPRA, JOSEPH (DO NOT DELETE)

48

BAYLOR LAW REVIEW

3/23/2017 9:56 AM

[Vol. 69:1

This language in Melendez-Diaz has been relied on by every circuit
court that has evaluated the admissibility of certificates offered under Rule
902(11) to provide the foundation for and to authenticate business records
under the hearsay exception provided by Rule 803(6). Every court has held
that the certificates permitted by Rule 902(11) do not violate the
Confrontation Clause—and Rule 902(13) is simply applying the same
principle of certification to electronic evidence as Rule 902(11) applies to
business records. A typical analysis is found in United States v. YeleyDavis,144 where the court held that a Rule 902(11) certificate authenticating
phone records as business records was properly admitted over a
confrontation objection:
Justice Scalia [in Melendez-Diaz] expressly described the
difference between an affidavit created to provide evidence
against a defendant and an affidavit created to authenticate
an admissible record . . . In addition, Justice Scalia rejected
the dissent’s concern that the majority’s holding would
disrupt the long accepted practice of authenticating
documents under Rule 902(11) and would call into question
the holding in Ellis [a case which had rejected a
confrontation challenge to the use of Rule 902(11)]. See
Melendez Diaz, 557 U.S. at n. 1 (“Contrary to the dissent’s
suggestion, . . . we do not hold, and it is not the case, that
anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing
the . . . authenticity of the sample . . . must appear in person
as part of the prosecution’s case.”).145
Every other circuit court with a reported decision on the topic has relied
on the Melendez-Diaz carve-out to hold that authenticating certificates do
not violate the Confrontation Clause.146
144

632 F.3d 673 (10th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 680–81.
146
See United States v. Albino-Loe, 747 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding no
confrontation violation where the “certifications at issue here did not accomplish anything other
than authenticating the A–File documents to which they were attached. In particular, they did not
explicitly state anything about Albino–Loe’s alienage.”); United States v. Brinson, 772 F.3d 1314,
1322–23 (10th Cir. 2014) (finding no confrontation violation where debit card records were
authenticated by a certificate, because the certificate was a “non-testimonial statement of
authenticity”); United States v. Thompson, 686 F.3d 575, 582 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding no
confrontation violation when employment records were authenticated as business record by
certificate: “the . . . record itself was not created for the purpose of establishing or proving some
145
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The professors in their public comment conceded that certificates
offered for business records under Rule 902(11) are not testimonial.147 They
did not directly challenge the existing, uniform case law. They further
conceded that Rule 902(14) is probably consistent with the Confrontation
Clause, because the certificate permitted there simply certifies a copy—and
the majority in Melendez-Diaz explicitly authorizes the use of certifications
that a document is an accurate copy.148 The professors’ complaint was that
Rule 902(13) is problematic because (1) it allows more than simply a
certification of a copy, as the certification can provide that the electronic
evidence to be admitted is from a process or system that produces an
accurate result; and (2) this additional certification can apply to machine
output that was produced after the litigated controversy arose.149 Thus,
under this line of thinking, a case like Yeley-Davis is acceptable because the
records authenticated were historic phone records—electronic information
that pre-existed the dispute. The professors argued that a certificate of
authentication is problematic when is used “to leverage into evidence
documents that have been created for the purpose of litigation.”
It is true that some of the machine-generated information that will be
authenticated under Rule 902(13) will be generated in anticipation of
litigation. One example would be the output of a gas chromatograph
machine that tested a substance obtained from the defendant at the time of
arrest. But that does not mean that a Confrontation Clause violation occurs
with the certification of such information. That is because, while the
machine output might be prepared for litigation, it is not testimonial
because it is not hearsay. Machines do not make statements, and cannot be
cross-examined; and the Confrontation Clause applies only to statements
that are hearsay.150 So why should it make any difference that a machine
fact at trial, admission of a certified copy of that record did not violate Thompson’s Confrontation
Clause rights”); United States v. Johnson, 688 F.3d 494, 505–06 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding that
certificates of authenticity presented under Rule 902(11) are not testimonial, and the notations on
the lab report by the technician indicating when she checked the samples into and out of the lab
did not raise a confrontation question, because they were offered only to establish a chain of
custody and not to prove the truth of any matter asserted).
147
See Public Comment from Richard Friedman et al., supra note 139, at 3–4.
148
Id. (citing Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 322–23).
149
Id. at 4.
150
See United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that readings from
an infrared spectrometer and a gas chromatograph did not violate the right to confrontation
because “data are not ‘statements’ in any useful sense. Nor is a machine a ‘witness against’
anyone.”); see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004) (noting that the
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output is prepared for the litigation? If an authentication under Rule 902(11)
is sound because it authenticates data that is not testimonial (as the
professors concede) then there is no reason why an authentication under
Rule 902(13) would be problematic when it, too, authenticates nontestimonial evidence. The difference in Melendez-Diaz is that the
certificates there interpreted the test results that were testimonial, because
the tests were conducted with human input in anticipation of a
prosecution.151 That is not being done in a Rule 902(13) certification. The
professors never explain why certifying items prepared for litigation is
problematic when the items themselves create no constitutional concern.
The case law does not support the view that authentication of nontestimonial evidence could violate the Confrontation Clause.152
But even if the professors are correct in finding a constitutional
distinction between pre- and post-controversy reports, that critique does not
affect the large number of certifications that will be made under Rule
902(13) of electronic evidence that is generated before any controversy.
That is, in many cases—probably most cases—the certification under Rule
902(13) will be certifying electronic information that was generated before
the litigation arose. Take the examples addressed above:
 a printout of the Windows Registry to prove that a thumb drive was
connected to a laptop;
 an internet service log that records internet access;
 metadata of whether and when a picture was taken on an iPhone;
 a log of text messages between coconspirators.
All of the above would have been generated before a controversy arose.
None is substantively different from the phone records in Yeley-Davis. So at
the very least, Rule 902(13) certifications would, even under the professors’
argument, be properly admitted in the large number of situations in which
the authenticated information was generated before the litigation arose.153
Confrontation Clause “does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than
establishing the truth of the matter asserted”).
151
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310–11.
152
See, e.g., United States v. Anekwu, 695 F.3d 967, 976 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding no
confrontation problem where “the certificates authenticated otherwise admissible records”).
153
This all assumes in any case that the government wishes to prove the authenticity of
electronic evidence to the jury by way of a certificate. The government may well opt to use the
certificate to pass the admissibility threshold with the judge, and then establish its authenticity to
the jury (if challenged, as it often is not) by way of a witness, who will likely provide a more
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2. Certifying Accuracy
The professors posed another argument regarding the Confrontation
Clause and Rule 902(13): that the certification under Rule 902(13) is
problematic because the preparer will certify that the process or system
“produces an accurate result.”154 This certification is apparently
distinguished from one properly provided in a Rule 902(11) certification—
that a document is authentic. But when one drills down into this argument,
it turns out that the distinction is evanescent at best, and hopefully not the
kind of difference (if any) on which the Constitution relies.
A certificate admitted under Rule 902(11) does far more than
authenticate a copy. It contains the factual assertions that the records were:
(1) created at or near the time of the events they purported to establish, by
someone with knowledge of those events; (2) kept in the course of regularly
conducted business; (3) made as part of that business’s regular practice; and
(4) true and correct copies.155
Such a certification, to be effective, will also provide the factual
predicates for the first three conclusions, which are necessary to establish
admissibility under the business records exception, Rule 803(6). Essentially
what the affiant is certifying is that the record is reliable—it fits the
reliability requirements of the business records exception. If that
certification is permissible, as the professors concede, then what is the
problem with a certificate that shows that the record is a product of a
process that produces an accurate result? There is no substantive difference
between reliability and accuracy. The Crawford line of cases is riddled
with counter-intuitive fine line distinctions, but this one seems too fine even
for Crawford.
In sum, the concern about the proposed amendments under the
Confrontation Clause is quite overstated, because:
 The concern is limited to Rule 902(13), as Rule 902(14) is limited to
certification of copies.
 The concern about authenticating information prepared after the
litigation arose is misguided because (1) most of the information
authenticated under Rule 902(13) will have been produced before
interesting presentation than a certificate ever could. When the government makes that decision,
the certificate raises no constitutional concerns because it is not admitted at trial and so the
declarant is not a “witness against” the defendant.
154
See Public Comment from Richard Friedman et al., supra note 139, at 4.
155
FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
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the litigation arose; and (2) machine-generated information that is
produced after the litigation arises will not be testimonial (and if it
is, it would be subject to confrontation objection on its own ground,
and will not be saved by Rule 902(13)).
 The concern about certifying accuracy is no different from
certifications found acceptable under Rule 902(11) in which the
certification establishes reliability.

3. Adding a Notice-and-Demand Provision to Rule 902(13) for
Criminal Cases
Assuming arguendo that there is a legitimate concern that certification
under Rule 902(13) could raise a confrontation problem in criminal cases,
there is a procedural device that could be added to the rule that would solve
this concern. It is called a notice-and-demand provision, and it essentially
operates as a means of obtaining a waiver of the defendant’s right to
confrontation—the defendant is given notice that the government intends to
introduce a testimonial certificate; if the defendant fails to demand
production of the declarant within the designated time period, then the right
to confront the declarant is deemed waived.
In 2013, Rule 803(10)—the hearsay exception for proof of an absence
of a public record—was amended to include a notice-and-demand
provision.156 This was because the rule allows a government official to file a
certificate that the official conducted a search for a record and found
none—and this search is ordinarily conducted in anticipation of using that
fact of absence (lack of a required record) at a criminal prosecution.157 Rule
803(10) now provides as follows:

156

Id. 803(10) (amended 2013).
An example is a prosecution for illegal reentry after deportation. To prove that the
defendant was in the United States without permission, the government can under Rule 803(10)
offer the certificate of an official who searched for a record of permission to re-enter and found
none. But that search was conducted in anticipation of litigation. See, e.g., United States v.
Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d 1156, 1161 n.3 (9th Cir. 2010), where, in an illegal reentry case, the
government proved unpermitted reentry by introducing a certificate of non-existence of
permission to reenter (CNR) under Rule 803(10). The trial was conducted and the defendant
convicted before Melendez-Diaz. On appeal, the government conceded that introducing the CNR
violated the defendant’s right to confrontation because under Melendez-Diaz that record is
testimonial. The court in a footnote agreed with the government’s concession, stating that its
previous cases holding that CNRs were not testimonial were “clearly inconsistent with Melendez157
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(10) Absence of a Public Record. Testimony—or a
certification under Rule 902—that a diligent search failed
to disclose a public record or statement if:
(A) the testimony or certification is admitted to
prove that
(i) the record or statement does not exist;
or
(ii) a matter did not occur or exist, if a
public office regularly kept a record or
statement for a matter of that kind; and
(B) in a criminal case, a prosecutor who intends to
offer a certification provides written notice of that
intent at least 14 days before trial, and the
defendant does not object in writing within 7 days
of receiving the notice—unless the court sets a
different time for the notice or the objection.
The Committee Note explains the basis for adding notice-and-demand
provisions:
Rule 803(10) has been amended in response to
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009). The
Melendez-Diaz Court declared that a testimonial certificate
could be admitted if the accused is given advance notice
and does not timely demand the presence of the official
who prepared the certificate. The amendment incorporates,
with minor variations, a “notice-and-demand” procedure
that was approved by the Melendez-Diaz Court.158
But adding a notice-and-demand provision to Rule 902(13) would be the
equivalent of squashing a gnat with a sledgehammer. Including a noticeand-demand provision would limit the effectiveness of the provision,
because the defendant can simply avoid the certificate by making the
demand—if only to make the prosecution go to the effort of producing the
authenticating witness. Thus the whole point of the amendment—to save

Diaz” because like the certificates in that case, a CNR is prepared solely for purposes of litigation,
after the crime has been committed.
158
FED. R. EVID. 803(10) advisory committee’s note to 2013 amendment (citation omitted).
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costs—would be muted in criminal cases. While that is acceptable if the
alternative is that the Rule will surely be struck down without it, it seems
far less acceptable if the risk of that result is remote, as is the case with Rule
902(13).
Moreover, there is another concern, one of rulemaking: it is to say the
least odd, and awkward, to include a notice-and-demand provision in a Rule
that will already have a notice provision. The two notice provisions would
be serving different functions. The basic notice provision would provide the
opponent an opportunity to meet the evidence. The notice-and-demand
notice provision would provide the opponent an opportunity to demand
production of the witness. It is difficult to have one notice provision cover
both concepts—especially when the general notice requirement is written
with flexible standards and the notice-and-demand provision is written with
specific time periods. Having two separate notice provisions in the same
rule is balky at best, and is likely to result in confusion and difficulties of
application.
But even if a notice-and-demand provision would not cripple the rule, or
make it overly complicated, there are other costs in adding it. The
professors concede that a notice-and-demand provision is completely
unnecessary for the many situations in which Rule 902(13) can be used to
authenticate electronic information that is generated before the litigation
arose. It is surely bad policy to institute a procedural requirement that by
definition is unnecessary to solve any problem. Thus, at a minimum, the
notice-and-demand language should be limited to the narrow situation of
certification of electronic evidence that is generated for purposes of
litigation.
Finally, any inclusion of a notice-and-demand provision will raise a red
flag about the lack of such a provision in Rule 902(11). Given the very
minor difference between an authenticating certificate under that rule and
under Rule 902(13), including a notice-and-demand provision in the new
rule might well be seen to operate as a concession that similar provisions
should be added to the older rule—even though Rule 902(11) has withstood
every constitutional challenged in the federal courts.
For all these reasons, the Advisory Committee was correct in
concluding that a notice-and-demand provision would be an unnecessary
and unwelcome addition to Rule 902(13).
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CONCLUSION
Determining whether digital evidence is authentic can be a difficult task,
but it is not a task that is different in kind from authenticating hardcopy
items. The admissibility standard for authenticity is relatively low, and
compiling circumstantial evidence tied to the purported source of the
electronic evidence will go a long way toward meeting that standard.
But expenditure of resources is a concern, especially if that expenditure
is required to meet broad objections like “my webpage might have been
hacked.” The Advisory Committee has been working to ameliorate some of
those costs; and a proper knowledge of the relationship between Rule
104(a) and (b) will go a long way toward streamlining the admissibility
decision for the judge and overcoming such blunderbuss arguments. This
Article hopefully reduces the burden of authenticating evidence further by
providing guidelines on how to authenticate the basic forms of digital
evidence used in trials today.

